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- 2  -PART  I 
A.  A  SHORT  HISTORY  OF  MODERN  GREECE 
B.  POLITICAL  INSTITUTIONS 
C.  CULTURAL  AND  SOCIAL  DEVELOPMENT 
- 3  -,.JART  I 
Greece  participated in the  second World  War  on  the 
side of  the Allies  after it was  attacked by  Italy on  28 
October  1940.  The  Greek  Army  repulsed the  Italian attack 
and  in  a  victorious  counter-attack pushed the  Italians back 
into Albania,  liberating Northern  Epiro.s  which  was  mainly 
inhabited by  Greeks. 
In April  1941  the  Germans  attacke~ after conquering 
Yugoslavia  and  conquered Greece.  They  evacuated the  country 
in  1944,  after four  years  of  occupation. 
In  December  1944,  the civil war  started,  which  lasted 
till 1949,  when  the  communist  forces  were  defeated and con-
stitutional monarchy  was  introduced. 
There  followed  various  governments,  mostly of  the right. 
In  1962/63  Geo~ge Papandreou,  as  leader of  the  Center  Union, 
won  the  elections with  a  majority of  53%  but  soon  he  encountered 
resistance  from  King  Cosntantine  and  the  Queen  Mother  in his 
reforms.  In 1965  he  resigned  followed  by  attempts to establish 
governments  by  dissidents  from  the Center  Un~on Party,  backed 
by  the conservative E.R.E.  Party.  However,  all attempts  failed 
due  to  the  fact  that  none  of  these  governments  united the  ne-
cessary majority  in  Parliament.  Finally,  new  elections were 
announced  for  April  1967  but  a  coup d'etat by  the  Colonels  fore-
stalled them.  In  December  1967  King  Constantin  fled  from  Greece, 
after  a  fa~led coup  against the  junta. 
In  1973  there  was  a  failed coup  by  the  Greek  Navy,  one 
destroyer  under  its Commander  Pappas  (now Chief of Staff of 
the  Greek  Navy)  escaping  to  Italy.  The  d1ctatorship  abolished 
kingship  and  proclaimed the republic  in June  1973,  the  dictator 
Papadopoulos  naming  himself  President.  In  November  1973  a  revolt 
of  students  who  barricated themselves  in the Polytechnic  School 
of Athens  was  repressed with  bloodshed.  A  coup d'etat threw 
- 4  -Papadopoulos  out  and  Ioannides  was  the  new  strong  man  of  the 
JUnta. 
The  junta then tried to interfere  in Cyprus  staging  a 
coup d'etat to overthrow the  President of  Cyprus,  Archibishop 
Makarios.  The  Greek  coup  d'etat provoked the  1nvasion of 
Cyprus  by  Turkish  landin~ forces  who  conquered  about  40%  of 
the  island after sometimes  fierce  fighting. 
Other  forces  in  th~ Greek  Army,  notably Generals  Davos 
and  Gratzios  who  commanded  the most  1mportant  forces  in the 
Greek  Army,  stationed in Northern  Greece,  1ntervened and over-
threw the  dicta~orsh1p in July  1974  and charged Constantin 
Karamanl1s,  then  in exile  in Paris·,  to  form  a  civil government 
with representatives  of all polit1cal parties.·  Actually the 
socialist  (then  not  yet  named  PASOK)  and  the  communist  party 
were  not  represented in the  government. 
Martial  law  was  abolished  and  liberty of  press  and poli-
tical  partie~ including  the  Communist  party,  which  was  banned 
from  1949,  were  reintroduced.  Elections  were  proclaimed  in 
November  1974,  which  gave  an  overwhelming majority to the party 
of  Mr.  Karamanlis,  Nea  Democratia.  In  December  1974  a  refe-
rendum  dec1ded  on  the  fate  of  monarchy  in Greece:  70%  of  the 
Greeks  voted  against  a  return to const1tutional monarchy  and 
in June  1975  a  new  democratic  cosntitution was  voted,  in which 
introduced parliamentary democracy  with  a  President  as  Head 
of  State. 
In  1975  Greece  asked  to  accelerate her  adhesion to the 
EEC  and  the  negot1at1ons  began  the  following  year.  The  adhesion 
act  was  signed  1n  Athens  1n  May  1979  and  Greece  became  a  full 
Member  from  the  1  January  1981. 
In  1977  Karamanlis'  party  aga1n  won  the  electHm but 
with  a  much  lower  major1ty,  while  PASOK  became  the  ma1n  oppo-
s1t1on party.  In  1980  Karamanlis  was  elected by  the  Greek 
Parl1ament  as  President of  the  Republic  and  was  succeeded  in 
- 5  -the leadership of his party by Georges  o~lli~,  wQo_replaced_~im ~lso as Prime 
Minister.  ,In the elections of October  -•8_1  PASOK  won  and Mr.  Papandreou  fanned the 
first Greek socialist government.  In ~e  new  parliament PASOK  had 174  seats 
.  .  . 
(48.06%  of votes};  Ne~ 0emocratia 113  se~ts (35.91%  of votes}  and the COmmunist  Party 
13  seats  (10.89%  at votes). 
The  government of P~)K has to deal with the foilawing diffieult problems:  revival 
'  .,  •  J  lr  • 
of the economy  which  was  in a  bad-state when  P~>K came 'in ~r  with a  stagnation of. 
investment and  high  ~xt~~nai debt,  fi~dlng ~f a  solution to the Cyprus  probiem and the 
Greek-Turkish  differen~s ~d  particiPation or withdrawal from  NATO·and  the status of 
American military bases in Greece. 
The Greek Government  has sent a  memorandum,  dated 19  March,  to the COmmission, 
concerning relations between Greece  and the Comm~ity.ahd asking for certain improve-. 
ments  in the condltions of Greek  accession. 
On  10  June 1982 ,the Commission  adopted  ~· c~ication to the Council  (prepared 
by Camlissioner Mr.  Burke,  to whom  the matter had been passed),  saying that on the 
'whole the EEC  could give a  favourable reply to the  questio~s posed by the Greek 
memorandum,  while still remaining with1n the limits of the Treaty and without the 
necessity for mod1f1cations to the conditions of Greek  accession. 
The Commission  invites the Council to decide as follows: 
recognize,  as the Greek  government requests,  the need to confront the particular 
problems which Greece has to face and to take them  into account within the framework 
outl1ned by the Commission  (see below po1nt 1). 
take note that the Commission will take those decisions which fall within its 
purview. 
invite the Commission  to make  appropriate proposals in the areas which fall within 
the Counc1l' s  purview. 
agree to adopt fair decisions upon all the proposals already submitted by the 
Commission  and on  those which  the Commission  is called upon to submit within the 
penods laid down  (see below point 2) • 
The  Counc1l  should,  furthermore,  1nv1te the Greek  government to remain in contact 
with the Commiss1on  in def1ning its economic policy and particularly in connection with 
its flve year economic  development plan,  the teilliS of which  should be canpatible with 
~_:ity  __ 9pj_~ctives and _pol:_!_cies. 
These proposals to the Council are being made  in good time so as to enable the 
Heads  of Government  to discuss them,  according to the wishes of the Greek  government, 
at the European Council on  28  and 29  June next. 
6 These proposals by the COmmission  ~o~he Council require the following explanations: 
1.  The  .<I_e!leral.  fr~_!'_k_ 1.s· that  ~e  · F:EC  ~an·  i:ontr'ibute  t~ the devel(:prent and 
solution of Greece's specific piol5lems by application of its policies  'and not by neans 
!:Jf. derogations to the  Tr!:~!2-~  ~  . Protocol VII  of  th~.  Accession Act  indicates that the 
Institution should do their utnost,  withi.n the possibilities offered by the existing 
.mstrurrents,  to take account of the specific situat1on of Greece.  The  Ccmnission also 
'  •  j  ' 
stresses that the un1.ty of Cornnunity  law does not mean  its unifonnity and that ~fie 
~-~.:'.l:l!.~~~!'~Pos_:;~!?-~~- _L_n  __  s~_i_!2.£  ..  :>J:.ttia!_i~'n~,  always provided that they are not 
incompatible with the  Tr~at1es ~d  ~  ~~t represent a  step backwards where  liberalization 
or wtegration is concerned.  What  is m::>re,  application of an act of Camrunity  law may 
be delayed. 
·'  . 
2.  On  several points the  ~!:pl1.es already eXist.  Council decisions on common  prices 
and related measures have answered the question of support prices for Greek  farmers. 
Certain structural measures  for agriculture have already been proposed. 
Other  structural measures  are  to be  extended to Greece 
before 31  July.  Moreover,  replies to several of Greece's problems will be provided by 
the "integrated Mediterranean  prograinrres". 
6a Greece  is  a  parliamentary democracy  headed  by  a  President. 
All  powers  belong to the  people  and  are exercised  for  their 
benefit.  The  State religion is Orthodox  Eastern Christianity. 
Executive  and  Legislative  Power 
The  President 
Executive  power  belongs  to the President who  is elected 
by  the Parliament  for  a  five-year  term.  He  may  be  re-elected 
once  only.  The  President  represents  the  State  in its relations 
with other  nations.  He  is commander-in-chief  of  the  armed  forces 
and  is empowered to  declare  war  and  conclude treaties.  The 
President appoints  the  Prime  Minister  and  the  other members  of 
the  government  on  the  Prime Minister's  recommendation.  The 
President convenes  Parliament once  a  year  and,  whenever  necessary, 
may  call a  special session.  In exceptional circumstances  he  may 
preside over the Cabinet,  convene  the  Council of the  Republic 
and  suspend Parliament  for  a  period not  exceeding thirty days. 
He  may  dissolve Parliament at the request of the  government  or 
with  the  consent of  the  Council  of the Republic.  In exceptional 
cases  he  may  organize  referenda.  He  has  the right of  veto over 
bills adopted  by  Parliament. 
The  government 
The  government  is  composed of  the  Prime  Minister  and the 
ministers  who  form  the  Cabinet.  The  government  formulates  and 
administers  the  general  policy of the  State  in  accordance with 
the  laws  and the Constitution.  The  Cabinet  must  have  the  support 
of  Parliament  and  can  be  dismissed  following  a  vote  of  no  confidence. 
The  Prime  Minister  is the  leader of whichever party holds  an 
absolute majority _in  Parliament or,  failing that,  the  leader of 
the party with  a  relative majority. 
Fr.-kmb.td/sm 
- 7  -The  Council  of  the Republic 
The  Council  of the Republic  is composed  of all former 
democratic presidents,  the  Prime  Minister,  the  leader of  the 
opposition  and  former  democratic  prime ministers  who  had the 
support of Parliament,  and is presided over  by  the President. 
It meets  when  the main  parties fail to  form  a  government  with 
the  support of Parliament  and may  instruct the President to 
appoin'l:  a  pri~e minister  who  may  or  may  not  be  a  Member  cf 
Parliament.  The  Council  may  also authorize the President to 
dissolve Parliament. 
The  Parliament 
Parliament  consists of  a  single  House  with  300  Members 
who  are elected by  secret  and direct  suffrage for  four  years. 
Parliament elects its own  President.  It meets  regularly each 
year  for at least  five  months.  Bills adopted by  Parliament 
are ratified by  the  President whose  veto may  be  overruled by 
an  absolute majority of all MPs.  Parliament  may  indict the 
President_by_a motion  signed by  one-third and  adopted by 
two-thirds of all the Members.  Parliament  may  also indict· 
~urrent or  former  Members  of  the  government.  The  accused is 
the~ called to  appear  before  an  ad  hoc  tribunal presided by 
the  President of the  Supreme  Court  and  made  up  of  twelve  judges. 
Certain legislative acts  as  specified in the  Constitut~on must 
be  passed by  a  full  House  of  Parliament,  which  may  only make 
decision's  by  an  absolute majority of  the  Members  present  and 
never  by  less than  a  quarter of  the  total number  of  Members. 
Under.the  Constitution certain legislative powers  may  not  be 
exercised by  more  than  two  parliamentary committees.  Parliament 
may  revise_ the Constitution according  to the procedure  laid down. 
The  judiciary 
Justice is administered through  the courts  by  permanent 
judges  who  are  fully  independent  in their office  and  in their 
function.' .·The  President appoints  the  judges  for  life after 
consulting  a  judicial council.  The  judges are bound  only by 
the Constitution and  by  the  law.  The  courts are  subdivided 
'Fr  .. - kmc . td/  sm 
- 8  -into civil and  criminal  administrative courts  set  up  under 
special  laws.  They  may  not  apply  laws  which  are  contrary 
to the Constitution.  The  highest court of  appeal  is  a  special 
Supreme  Court. 
Certa~n laws  wh~ch were  passed before the enactment  of 
the  present Constitution and  which  have  not  been  ruled 
unconstitutional  remain  in  force,  other  laws,  even  where 
they are  contrary to the  Constitution,  remain  in  force  until 
they are  repealed by  other legislative measures. 
Ind~vidual and  special  right~ 
All citizens are equal  under  the  Constitut~on and  before 
the  law with  the  same  rights  and  the  same  obligations.  No 
title or distinction may  be  conferred or recognized.  Every 
ind~v~dual has  the  right to total protection of  life,  honour 
and  l~berty,  irrespective of nationality,  race,  belief or 
political  op~nion.  No  law  may  be  made  retroactive  and  no 
citizen may  be  punished  w~thout a  regular trial.  Freedom of 
speech,  of  the  press,  of  association  and of  religion are 
guaranteed by  the Constitution.  Every  ~ndividual has  the 
right to  a  free  education  provided  by  the  State.  Everyone 
has  the right to work  and all workers  have  the right to equal 
pay  for  equal  work,  without  d~scr~m~nation based on  sex or on 
any  other  grounds.  The  right of  association,  the  right of 
ownership  and  the  freedom  to establish political parties are 
guaranteed by  the Constitution.  All citizens  aged  twenty  years 
or  more  are  requ~red to vote.  No  one  may  exercise his  r~ghts 
or  freedoms  ~n  v~olation of the  Constitut~on. 
In  accordance  with its long-established  spec~al status, 
Mount  Athas  w~ll  reta~n its autonomy  w~th~n the  State of Greece 
and its sovereignty  w~ll remain  unchallenged. 
Fr.-kmb.td/sm 
9 C.  CULTURAL  AND  SOCIAL  u~VELOPMENT 
Educat1on  and  Culture 
Since  1975  the  period of  compulsory  educat1on has  been  n~ne 
years.  Var1ous  reforms  have  recently  been  adopted to deal  with  the 
extremely  ser1ous  problems  in  the  educat1onal  sector  1n Greece. 
The  first problem to  be  dealt  w1th  is  the fairly high proport1on 
of  people  who  are  1lliterate or  poorly educated.  The  statist1cs on 
illiteracy based  on  the  March  1971  census  show  that of  the  7,302,560 
Greeks  who  were  above  ten years  of  age  at  the  t1me,  1,040,000  -
three-quarters  of  whom  were  women  - could neither  read  nor  wr1te. 
The  statist1cs also  show  that 2,431,160  persons  had  not  completed the1r 
primary  school  studies.  The  vast majority  of  those  persons  who  are 
ill1terate or  poorly  educated f1gure  amongst  the  highest  age  groups. 
It is to be  hoped  that w1th  the  increase  1n  the  number  of  pr1mary 
schools  over  recent  years  ill1teracy may  shortly be  a  thing of  the 
past. 
The  second  problem,  which  has  paralyzed the edubational  system 
for  a  long  t1me,  is the  language  question.  The  Colonels'  reg1me 
resc1nded  the  provisl_ons  of  the educational  reform promulgated  1n 
1964  by  George  Papandreou's  Government  and  once  again  1ntroduced the 
compulsory  use,  from  the  final primary  school  classes  onwards,  of  the 
purest archaic  language1  in place  of  demot1c  (popular  language),  which 
lS  the  language  of  l1terature  and authentic national tradition  and  the 
language  that  1s  spoken  in the  home.  Bil1ngualism  (purist  language  -
popular  language),  together  with  outdated educat1onal  programmes,  has 
made  a  mockery  of  the efforts  made  by  the  educational  system  and  placed 
a  d1ff1cult barr1er  1n  the  way  of  learn1ng.  In  1976  the  Government 
permanently  re1ntroduced the  popular  language  for  all educat1onal 
purposes  1n  pr1mary,  secondary  and  higher  schools. 
Since  1974  spcc1al efforts have  been  made  by  the  Government  1n 
the  field  of  national educat1on.  All  material  and  apparatus  for 
schools  and  univcrs1t1es  are  to  be  prov1ded  free  of  charge  1n  accord-
ance  with  recent  reforms. 
1The  pur1st  language  (katharevousa)  is supported by  conservatives, 
demotic  by  l1berals  and  progressives. 
- 10  -Education  in primary  schools  (demotikon)  lasts for  six years 
and  children  are  accepted  from  the  age  of  f~ve and  a  half.  The 
social prestige of teachers,  who  are trained  ~n teacher-training 
colleges,  is not  very  h~gh and their salaries are  inadequate. 
Children  advance  from  primary  school to secondary  school  without 
taking  an  exam. 
§~~Q~9~fY-~9~~~t!Q~ 
Seco~dary educat~on also lasts six  years.  The  first three years 
are  spent  in  the  gymnas~on  (lower  secondary)  and  the  last three  years 
in  the  Lykeion  (upper  secondary).  To  advance  from  the  gymnasion  to the 
Lyke~on an  .examination  must  be  passed  in three  sections:  general, 
class~cal,  profess~onal and  technical.  A  Leaving certificate is 
awarded  to  pup~ls who  complete their studies in the  Lykeion~ 
Since  thPre  is  no  division between Church  and State,  pr~vate 
teaching  does  not  have  the  same  denom~national character  as  in other 
ccuntries1 .  About  8%  of  Greek  children attend private primary  and 
secondary  educational  courses.  The  general  level  of  pr~vate educat~on 
is,  for  the  most  part,  h~gher than that of public education.  Some 
pr~vate schools  or  frondist~r~a prepare pupils  for  universityentrance 
examinations.  The  vast maJority  of  pupils  who  want  to go  to  univers~ty 
attend  lessons  ~n  frond~stir~a as well  as  the~r  cour~es in  the Lykeion. 
Entrance  to university  can  only be  ga~ned by  passing  a  national 
un~versity entrance  exam.  The  pass  rate is in  the  reg~on of  30%2 . 
Unsuccessful  candidates  may  resit the  examinat~on:  many  of  them try 
to enrol  in  fore~gn  univers~t~es
3  A  recent  reform,  wh~ch is being 
gradually  ~mplemented,  allows  pupils  in Ufper  secondary  schools  who 
obta~n  suff~c~ent marks  ~n their school  exams  to enter  u~ivcrsity 
w~thout taking the  entrance,exam. 
I~~ Gr~~-;;-~--rel~g~ous education is  o:;iven  1n all primary  and  secondary 
schools,  both  public  and private. 
2rn  1979,  out of  74,692  candidates,  23,247  students  were  admitted 
to universities  and 1nstituteE of  technology  (KATEE),  in  other words 
a  pass  rate of  31%. 
3According  to  f1gures  suppl-~ed by  the  Bank  of Greece,  based  on  exchange 
controls,  there  are  30,000 Greek  students  abroad. 
- 11  -In  Greece  there  are  SlX  un1versities,  one  polytechnic  and  six 
h1gher  educ~t1onal inst1tutes,  wh1ch  in  1979  adm1tted more  than 
100,000  students.  Law  No.  875/1979,  w~1ch limited the period over 
wh1ch  students  who  failed their exams  too often could claim  a  university 
maintenance  grant,  was  suspended at the  beginn1ng  of  1980  following  a 
general  u~ivers1ty s1t-in by  student  action  committees.  However,  this 
figure  1s  bound  to be  an  ULder-est1mate  because  many  students receive 
financial  a1d  from  their parents  abroad wh1ch  means  that they  are  not 
included in the  Bark  of Greece's statist1cs. 
Instl  tutes of  technology,  which  ha,·e:  developed rapidly  in recent 
years,  acnut  about  33,000  students  in  25  teaching centres throughout 
the  whole  of  Gr~ece. 
HEALTH  AND  SOCIAL  SECURITY 
Health  ------
The  State  is making  a  special effort to deal with health in Greece 
devoting almost  14%  of  the  budget to health expenditure  each year. 
Doctors 
Greece  has  a  large  number  of  doctors,  with  204  doctors  per 
100,000  inhab1tants1  For  several years  the  Government  has  been 
taking measures  to  l1mit  the  number  of students enrolling in the 
med1cal  faculties.  It is also making efforts to encourage  doctors  to 
enter pract1ce  in the provinces  because  there  1s  an  over-concentration 
of  doctors  in the  Athens  - Piraeus  region,  where  almost half of  the 
country's  doctors  are  located. 
In  Greece  there  are  720  hospitals  and clinics providing  59,000 
beds.  Th1s  number  i.s  quite  small  since,  to  comply  with  the  norms  laid 
down  by  the  WHO,  there  should  be  more  t  ho:m  70,000  beds  in  the  country. 
Private hospitals  account  for  40%  of  the  total hospital sector.  As 
1n  many  European  countries,  there  is  a  shortage  of  nurses  in Greece: 
1n  1978  there were  18,000,  whereas  a  min1mum  of  32,000  were  required. 
l By  compar1son,  1n  1978  France  only  had  147  doctors  per  100,000 
1nhabitants. 
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Resp~nsibility  .f~r the'general social security  scheme  for  wage 
•  '  '  ,j  •  ~ 
earners lies with the Social Security Foundation  (IKA)  established in 
.,  ':.  •  t  '  ·.  . 
1934.  In  1978  there  were  l,200,000,workers  and employees  insured by 
the  IK~
1 • 
The  total agricultural population  (farmers  and agricultural 
labourers.)  is affiliated to the Ag·ricultural Workers'  Organization  (OGA) 
insurance  scheme,.  which  in  !976  covered 1,600,000 people·. 
Civil servants  and public employees  are covered by  the  State social 
s~curity scheme. 
In addition to these  three major  insurance  funds,  there  are  397 
special social security bodies  in Greece with  each professional branch 
of  self-~mployed workers  having  its own  insurance  system.  This  leads 
to certain disparities· and inequalities in the  payment  of  social benefits. 
For  several years  a  special effort has  been• made  to simplify and  standard-
ize  retirement  schemes..  Thus,,  in  1978.,  the  IKA  adopted the rule of  paying 
old-age  pensions  after  35  years'  service in line with other social security 
funds.  However,  the  pension  scheme  for civil servants  and affiliated 
bodies'is particularly advantageous  becauser  in addition to their pension 
rights,  they  receive  on  retirement  a  lump  sum  which,  dependin'g  on  category, 
grade·or office,  can  amount  to between  two  and five years'· salary. 
THE  CULTURAL  MOVEMENT 
Greece  is not  j·ust  a·  seafaring nation,  but also  a  country of  _ 
musicians,  poet~and artists.  Greece~s rich history serves as  a. 
direct  inspiration for artistic creativity which  has  undergone  an 
unprecedented revival over the  last thirty years.  Thus,  Greece  has 
received  two  Nobel  prizes  for  literature in the  course of  the  last 
20 years. 
Greek  culture is based on  an  authentic popular tradition  w~ich is 
insep~rable from  the political strugg1e. 
1social se;urity contributions for  a  wag,e  earner  amount  to  29%  of his 
total remunera'tion:  18.75%. of this  sum  is paid by  the  employer  and 
10.25%  by  the  employee. 
- 13  -Nikos  Kazantzakis  (1885-1957)  can  be  considered as  the  greatest 
novel1st  of  modern  Greek  literature.  Also  an  author  of  numerous 
poems,  Kazantzakis  only  began  to write his  prose  work  in  1946  - which 
bears w1tness  to his  attachment  to his  home,  Crete  - beginning with 
Alexis  Zorba.  He  also published Christ Recrucified  (1954)  and  The 
Little Poor  Man  of  God  (1957). 
Notable  amongst  modern  authors  are Vassilis Vassilikos,  the  author 
of  Z,  Antonis  Samarakis,  known  {n  France  for his  novel  The  Mistake,  and 
Stratis Tsirkas,  who  wrote Cities Adr1ft  and  The  Man  of  the Nile. 
Modern  Greek  literature is trying to achieve  a  new  synthesis.  The 
cr1s1s  which  it has  gone  through  is in fact the  same  crisis that the 
whole  of  Greece  has  undergone  since  independence. 
Byzant1ne  religious music  and  trad1t1onal  folk  mus1c  are  the  two 
sources  of  1nspiration for  contemporary  Greek  composers.  Manos 
Hadj1dak1s  and  M1kis  Theodorak1s  are clearly the best  known  Greek 
mus1c1ans  abroad.  However,  Greece  also has  a  large  number  of  other 
talented composers:  Cyprien Katsar1s,  Louk1anos  Kila1donis,  Yannis 
Markopoulos,  Thanos  Mikroutsikos,  Diony~is Savopoulos  and  Yann1s  Xenakis. 
After  an  extremely  long  per1od  dur1ng  which  Greek  sculpture was 
lim1ted to copying ancient  sculpture,  a  modern  school  of  sculptors  was 
founded  at the  beginning  of  this century with  lead1ng  exponents  such  as 
Tak1s,  Agamemnon  Makris  and  Giorgos  Zongolopoulos. 
Greek  pa1nting  has  for  a  long  time  drawn  its inspiration  from  the 
final  per1od of  the  Byzant1ne  era.  After  Greek  independence,  the 
works  of  numerous  painters were  characterized by western  1nfluences. 
Today  the  1nfluences  on  painting  are  many:  Byzantine art,  na1ve  painting, 
abstract  a~t,  etc.  The  most  representative modern  Greek  pa1nters  are 
N1kos  Engonopoulos,  Nikos  Hatz1kyriakos-Ghikas,  Tassos  Hatzis,  Yann1s 
Tsarouch1s  and  Sp1ros  Vass1liou. 
There  are  a  dozen  dallies  1n Athens  and  three  in Thessalonlki,  all 
of  wh1ch  are  distributed throughout  the  whole  of Greece1 .  A  total of 
more  than  a  hundred  newspapers  are published in Greece.  All the Greek 
TThe·;~~-nat1onal press  agency  (The  Athens  Press  Agency)  wh1ch 
d1stributes  1ts  own  despatches  and,  under  agreements  with the major 
1nternat1onal  agencies,  covers  all major  news  events. 
- 15  -dailies  follow  a  distin· L  polltical line  and  tend to express  oplnjons 
rather than prov1de  news.  The.  Greek  press  devotes  a  large part of  its 
coverage  to articles on  foreign  affa1rs.  Numerous  papers  with  copright 
agreements  produce  1n  fnll certaln artlcles taken  from  the  international 
press. 
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1.  Agriculture 
The  agricultural sector is  comparatively more  important to the  Greek 
economy  than it is in  the  other Member  States of the  Community.  The 
agricultural sector contributes  20%  to  the  GNP  in  Greece  compared  to  13% 
in  Spain,  16%  in Portugal,  9%  in Italy and  5%  in  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
In  Greece  21%  of the working  population  lS  employed in the  agricultural 
sector  compared  to  26%  in Spain,  29%  in Portugal,  17%  in Italy and  8.7% 
in the  Community  as  a  whole1. 
About  four  million hectares  are  cultivated in Greece,  in other words 
30%  of the  country's total area.  Productivlty in Greek  agriculture is 
considerably  lower  than  the  Community  average  and  the  climatological 
conditlons  do  not permit  a  great  deal of product differentiation. 
However,  they  are partlcularly favourable  for certain crops,  such  as 
citrus  fruits,  olives,  vines,  tomatoes,  vegetables,  peaches  and  apricots. 
The  low  productivity is  due,  to  a  large extent,  to the  segmentation 
of  farm holdings  which,  in many  cases,  prevents  mechanization. 
Approximately  25%  of agricultural holdings  are  smaller than  5  hectares, 
whereas  only  1%  of holdings  are  larger than  20  hectares.  Furthermore, 
27%  of useable  agricultural areas  are  in mountain  regions,  where  onlv  a 
limited number of crops,  such  as  wheat  and  vegetables,  can be  grown 
and  sheep  and  goats  reared. 
Agricultural  incomes  are,  on  the whole,  lower  than  incomes  in  the 
cities,  despite  the  fact  that  they  have  lncreased  a  good  deal  in recent 
years.  This  has  resulted in the migration of  the  agricultural population 
towards  the  cities  ln  Greece  and  abroad.  However,  despite migration, 
there is stlll a  Slgnificant level of  underemployment  of the  labour  f~rcP. 
ln  Greek  agriculture.  Under-employment  can  only  be  eradicated by 
Slgnificantly  reducing  the  number  of agricultural  employees  to  a  level 
somewhere  near the  average  of  the other Member  States  of the  Community. 
However,  thls is  the  major problem of the  Greek  economy.  In  a  period 
of increased  unemployment  like today,  the other sectors of the  economy 
(lndustry  and  services)  are  not  able  to  absorb  the  manpower  which  can 
be  released by  agrlculture.  If such  a  release were  to happen  suddenly, 
unemployment  in Greece,  which  at the  moment  is still the  lowest  in  the 
Community,  would rise dramatically.  Consequently,  agricultural  under-
employment  can  only  be  reduced gradually at  a  rate that will allow 
industry  and  the  servlces  to  absorb  tne  labour  force  released by 
agriculture. 
1  1977  figures 
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the  final years of  the  Accession  Agreement,  with the  result that Greece  has 
a  positive agricultural balance  in its trade with  the  Member  States of the 
Community.  This  happened,  despite Greece's  adverse  position as  regards  the 
transportation of agricultural products,  which  renders  significantly 
dearer  the  consumer  prices  in the  European  markets  (e.g.  70%  of the  consumer 
price  for oranges  on  the  European  markets  is  the  transport cost),  because 
Greece  is  ~n a  very  advantageous  posit~on for producing these products. 
50  - 53%  of Greek  agricultural exports  go  to the  Community,  while 
25  - 30%  of Greek  imports  come  from  the  Community.  In  the  coming years 
there will  have  to be  an  increase  in  the  amount  of both  exports  and  imports. 
In  exports  following  the  end of the  transitional periods,  in imports  because 
of preferential treatment  for  these  products  on  the  Greek market  compared 
to products of third countries,  since  import duties  for Community  products 
are being  abolished,  while  the  regulations of the  common  agricultural policy 
(CAP)  apply to products of third countries. 
Production of peaches  ~n Greece  accounts  for  5%  of international 
production,  while  Greek  exports  account  for  10  - 11%  of the  international 
peach market.  10%  of the  wine  produced is exported,  while  total  Greek 
exports  of agricultural products  consist of two-thirds  fruit  and vegetables, 
one-quarter tobacco  and  6%  oil and seeds  for producing oil.  On  the other 
hand,  Greece, is deficient in cereals  (42%  of total agricultural imports), 
dairy products  (12%),  beef  and  veal  (8%),  while being  more  or less self-
sufficient in potatoes,  pigmeat,  eggs,  poultry and  fish. 
Integration of Greek  agricultue has  been  more  d~fficult for the  Commun~ty 
than  integration of  greek  industry both because  of its relatively larger 
importance  forthe_Greek  economy,  and because of the  increased competition 
with  similar products  of other Member  States.  Greece is  a  precedent  for the 
access~on of  Spa~n and  Portugal.  It was  therefore  agreed that there would 
be  a  general  transit~onal period of  5  years  for all agricultural products 
and  a  transitional period of  7  years  for  fresh  and processed tomatoes,  and 
for  fresh  and  preserved peaches. 
During  these  transitional periods  Greek  prices must  be  brought  ~nto 
line with those  of the  Community  and  the  agricultural policy harminized 
accordingly.  For this  reason  a  system of compensatory  amounts  has  been 
brought into operation. 
Greek  pr1ces were  generally  lower  than  those  in the  Community  and  the 
Greek  market  weaker,  as  is  shown  in the  following table. 
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Market  and/or  intervention prices  for  the  crops year  1981-1982. 
Only  those  products  are  included  for which  the  Greek  and  Community  prices 
d~ffer  (in  EUA  and  in  100  kg) . 
!  I  !  Product  Greece  EEC  - 9  '  Product  Greece  EEC  - 9 
TOMATOES  ~£:~!3~  --------
1-20  June  7.18  11.03  July  15.40  12.72 
21-30 _June  6. 72  10.27  August  14.86  12.33 
July  5.89  8.88  September  13.99  11.71 
August  5.35  7.99  October  13.99  11.71 
September  5.65  8.49  November  14.34  11.96 
October  6.65  10. 15  December  14.86.  12.33 
November  7.48  11.54  January  15.22  12.59 
April 
~§~<;;;!:!§§  ~~~§-~l~§_g~~§ 
June  17.55  24.74  August  20.29  19.60 
July  16.80  23.61  September  16.38  16. 17 
September  October 
~!?t!Q~§  TANGERINES  ----------
June  21.78  23.58  17-30  November  22.22  26.22 
July  22.35  24.21  December  21.81  25.71 
August 
I 
22.24  24.08  January  21.19  24.95 
September  20.97  22,68  February  20.78  24.44 
October  20.74  22.43  §~§§~-Q~~gg:§ 
November  17.97  19.38  December  17.11  23.13 
December  17.75  19. 13  January  15.91  21.36 
January  18.21  19.64  February  16.26  21.87 
February  17.64  19.01  May  16.43  22.12 
March  17.21  19.64  April  16.60  22.37 
April  19.13  20.65  May 
May  19.59  21. 16  Q~!Y§_Qf~  186.97  196.33 
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- 20  -Harmonization  therefore means  ~ncreased prices  for Greek  agricultural 
products  and  increased incomes  for  Greek  farmers,  but,  at the  same  time, 
it means  that Greek  consumers  Wlll  be  worse  off.  Moreover,  during the 
5-year transitional period,  the  Greek market will be  opened  to  a  number 
of imports  of  agr~cultural products  from  the  countries with which  the 
Community  has  signed  preferenti~l agreements  (ACP,  Maghreb,  Mashrek,  Israel). 
The  Community's  regulations  for guaranteeing the price of olive oil 
and wheat,  and  the  Community's  subsidies  for processed fruits  and  vegetables, 
will be  extended  in stages  to  Greek  producers.  The  Community  has  passed 
legislation for  new  market  arrangements  for  cotton, .dried f1gs  and  grapes, 
products which  are particularly important  for  Greece  (e.g.  Greek  production 
of  cotton  accounts  for  99%  of the  Community's  production). 
On  the other hand,  during  the  transitional period certain national 
subsid1es will be  abolished,  such  as  support  for the  production of fertilizers 
aimed at reducing prices  for  farmer buyers  because  product1on subsidies 
conflict with  Community  regulations. 
The  co-responsibility  levy  for milk  and  dairy products will not be 
imposed  on  Greek  producers  because of the  small size,  on  average,  of Greek 
undertakings.  The  European  Parliament also  adopted the Commission  of the 
European  Communities'  proposal  to increase  appropriations  earmarked  for 
research  in the  agr1cultura~ sector from  18,602,000  EUA  to  21,392,000  EUA. 
The  additional  appropriations will be  used for  research in Greece. 
Implementation of the  CAP  in Greece will have  the  following  effects: 
1.  Incomes  - Employment:  As  mentioned  above,  higher Community  prices  and 
the stronger market  organization in the  Community,  dating  from  the  time 
when  the  CAP  was  1mplemented in Greece  in January  1981  and particularly 
after it has  been  fully  implemented  following  the  end of the  5-year 
transit1onal period,  will increase  agricultural incomes  in Greece,  thereby 
halting the  migrat1on of the  agricultural population to the  cities,thus 
having  a  beneficial effect on  overall employment  in Greece.  Furthermore, 
since  the  agricultural  regions  are  usually  a  country's  least developed 
regions,  which  is particularly true in the  case  of Greece,  the  implementation 
of the  CAP  is benefiting regional  development(by  increasing  incomes  and 
by  maintaining  the  labour  force  in these  areas)  and  complementing  the 
Community's  regional  policy. 
'2.  Prices- Inflation:  Increased  farm prices  have  a  negative effect on 
the  consumer price  1ndex  and,  in  the  long  run,  on  inflation.  To  the extent 
that  Conununity  (which  usuaJJy  mc.:~ns  more  expensive)  imports  of agricultural 
products  (beef  and  veal,  dairy  products,  cereals,  etc.)  will replace previous 
El.-rw.jil/sjc  - 21  -imports  onto  the Gree·k  market  fLom  third countries,  the  rate of inflation 
w1ll  be  adversely  affected.  On  the  other hand,  1nsofar as  imports  from 
third countr1es with preferential agreements will not be  burdened with 
Greek  1mport duties or will replace  Greek  production which  is inefficient 
and more  expensive,  the  rate of inflation will be  favourably  affected. 
3.  Production:  The  CAP's  higher prices  for certain Greek  products  may  in 
the  long  term  lead to  an  1ncrease in Greek  production of these products. 
This  1s  most  likely  to happen with  fruit  and  vegetable  producers.  The  size 
of  this 1ncrease will correspond to production elasticity for  these products 1 . 
4.  Consumption:  Higher prices  for cereals,  olive o1l,  dairy products  and 
meat  may  result in  reduced  demand  for  these  products.  Whether or not/there 
is  a  reduction depends  upon  the pr1ce elasticity of  demand  for these products2 . 
Price elasticity of  demand  is relatively  important  for cereals  and  fruit 
and vegetables,  whereas  it should not be  so  important  for meat  and  dairy 
products  which  are  1nfluenced more  by  income  elasticity3  Per capita meat 
consumption in Greece  is  just over two-thlrds  of  the  Commun1ty  average. 
However,  desp1te  increased prices,  a  rise in meat  consumption  in Greece 
can be  expected with  increased incomes. 
On  the other hand,  for other products  increased production and  reduced 
demand  due  to  increased prices  may  lead to the  creation of large  surpluses 
in addition  to those  which  already exist and this will,  in  the  long  run, 
have  an  adverse effect on  the  Commun1ty  budget. 
1 
2 
3 
0  0 
0 
Production elasticity gives  the  percentage  variation of production at 
each  1%  variation of the price of the product which  is produced,  or 
D~  P 
(production elasticity of supply)  where  ~  = production 
Dp 
Pr1ce elastic1ty of 
equation  so  that Ex 
demand  is determined in relation to the previous 
= DX  .  P  where  X = demand.  However,  whereas  the 
Dp  X 
previous  equation is pos1tive  (ln other words  price increase = production 
increase),  price elast1city of  demand  is usually negative  (in other words 
pr1ce  increase  = decreased  demand) . 
Income  elastic1ty  gives  the  percentage  variation  1n  consumption  (or  demand) 
when  income  varies  by  1%.  It is  usually positive  (in other words  increased 
income  = increased consumption) . 
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to that of  the  Community.  The  Community will benefit  from  the  1nteg~at1on 
of the  complementary  sectors  ~ecause,  in the  sectors where  the  Community 
has  surpluses  (meat,  dairy  products,  cereals),  Greece's  accession  means 
that imports  from  outside  the  Community  onto  the  Greek  market will be 
replaced by  Community  products,  result1ng in some  reduction in Community 
surpluses.  Of  course,  this  reC'"Ctlon will not be  very  large,  because  the 
size of the  Greek  market is limited,  but  any  reduction in surpluses is 
desirable  as it lightens  the burden  on  the  Community's  budget. 
Table  2 
Product  Greek  production  as  %  Level  of self-
of production of  sufficiency of the  '9  I 
Community  of  I  9 I 
Cotton  99  -
Tobacco  51  29 
Fresh vegetables  18  94 
'  Olive kernels  and 
seeds  16  20 
Sheepmeat  15  63 
Rice  12  82 
Fresh  fruit  11  78 
The  pr1ce  increases  for  agricultural  products after the  dec1s1on 
of  the  Council of M1nisters  in  May  reached  on  the  average  (includ1ng 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  )  20%  for  Greek  agricultural products. 
The  Greek  M1n1ster  of Agr1culture,  Mr.  Sim1t1s  considered  them  to 
be  sat1sfactory. 
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follows  with  the  accession of Greece: 
1.  The  Community still has  a  shortage  in  products  such  as  citrus fruits, 
olive oil and certain other kinds  of fruits  and  vegetables.  As  far  as 
these  products  are  concerned,  Greece's  accession creates  no  difficulties 
in the  Community.  In products where  competition  ~s  ~ncreased because of 
Greece's  accession  (fruit,  vegetables,  olive oil),  the  Community's  consumers 
benefit because,  as  a  result  of  competition;  they  can  pay  lower prices or 
pay  the  same  prices  for better quality.  The  Community's  agr~cultural 
market,  in contrast to the  industrial market,  is not free but controlled 
competition existing only  on  a  limited scale.  The  difficulties of  the 
Community's  agricultural market,  such  as  surpluses,  are  tara large  degree 
due  to  the weakening of  competit~on.  Any  increase in competition is therefore 
beneficial  for  the  Community  as  a  whole. 
2.  Greece  has  a  shortage in products  such  as  cereals,  dairy products, 
and beef  and  veal which will be  met  by  Community  imports,  benefiting the 
Community  through  reduction of its surpluses. 
3.  Only  in the  case of wine  and  a  few  kinds  of fruit will accession 
increase  the  Community's  level of self-sufficiency  and  surpluses,  thereby 
exacerbating the  Commun~ty's agricultural problems. 
Greece's  access~on as  a  whole,  and  the  future  accession of Spain  and 
Portugal,  contrary  to certain  op~nions, is beneficial  for  the  Community 
because of the  complementar~ty of the  agricultural sectors  of these 
countries with  that of the  Community. 
On  the  other hand,  it is  more  diff~cult to  assess  the overall net 
result of Greece's  'agricultural accession'  to  the  Commun~ty in  terms  of 
Greek welfare.  The  net  result will  depend  upon  the  following  factors: 
1.  ind~sputable  ~ncrease  ~n farmers'  incomes. 
2.  Whether  or not  there is  an  increase in  consumer prices.  On  the 
whole,  the  Lmplementat~on of the  CAP  will result in increased consumer 
prices  adversely  affecting overall welfare. 
3.  Transfer of  resources.  In its present  form  the  CAP  gives  more 
support  (with better market  regulations)  to products  from  northern  reg1ons 
than  to Mediterranean products.  Also,  because  of  the  CAP's  present 
arrangements  large productive  units  can benefit more  easily  from it  than 
can  small  ones.  However,  for  the  most  part,  Greece  has  small  units  and 
cultivated Med1terranean  products.  This  means  that the present  CAP  will 
result ln  a  ncl  transfer of  resources  from  Greece  to  the  Community,  as 
happened  to  ~ certain degree  w1th  the Mezzog1orno.  A  study  by  the  Commission 
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conclusion.  'this means  that under  e~±sting conditions  the  operation of  the 
CAP  could result in  a  net  t~ansfer of resources·from Meditarranean countries 
to  the  richer northern  countries' 1 .  The  effect on  welfare is negat1ve. 
4.  The  replacement of  imports  of agricultural products  from  outside 
the  Corrununity  (which  previously were  more  competitive but  are  now  becoming 
uncumpet1tive  because of  the  abolition of Greek  import  duties  on  imports  from 
the  Community}  by  Comm~nity imports  is  tantamount  to  trade  diversion2 ,  which 
has  an  adverse effect on.welfare. 
With  the  exception of point  1,  the  implementation of  the  CAP  in its 
present  form  into Greece will have  negative  consequences  for  Greek welfare. 
For this  reason  reform of the  CAP  is essential as  far  as  the Meditarranean 
countries  are  concerned3. 
1  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  DG  II,  Group  of Economic 
Advisers,  'Analysis of the  economic  consequences  of the  south enlargement 
of  the  EC  by  Greece,  Spain  and Portugal',  Brussels,  June  1977,  page  38 
2  Trade  diversion exists when  imports  from  less efficient sources  (in other 
words,  imports  that are essentially more  expensive)  replace  more 
eff1cient  (essentially  cheaper)  imports.  This  can  happen when  imports 
that cost more  to produce  are  cheaper  on  the  final  market because  import 
dulles  un  them  ure  abolished whereas  they  are  not  abolished  on  other  impor1 ·, 
(which  were  cheaper  before}  from  thjrd countries. 
In  general,  all empirical  studies  agree  that the  CAP  has  led  to  trade 
divers1on,  although  they  reach  different conclusions  as  to the  ndture of 
th1s  trade  diversion,  adversely affecting welfare  as  a  result.  In  th1s 
connection  see  the  followinq  study  which  brings  together the  results of  many 
emp1rical  studies  on  this  :topic.:  Erik Thorbecke,  Emil1o  Pagoulatos, 
'The  effects of European  economic  integration on  agriculture'  in Bela 
Balassa  'European  economic integration',  North  Holland Publish1ng  Company, 
Amsterdam  1975. 
3  In this  connection  see  1:  A.  Pepelasis  'The  structure of Greek  agriculture 
and  the  expected  impact  upon  entering the  Community',  Agricultural  Bank 
of Greece,  Athens,  1977;  2:  Commission  des  CE,  delegation pour l'elargissement 
'Consequences  de  l'elargissement dans  le domaine  agricole',  Bruxelles,  1978 
3;  A.Ries  'Structure  de  l'economie  agricole  de  la Grece  et PAC',  Institut 
d'etudes  europeennes,  colloquy  'La Grece  et la Communaute',  Mai  1977; 
4:  Commission  des  CE,  DG  II,  Groupe  des  Conseillers  Economiques',  'Analysis 
of  the  economic  consequences  of  the  south enlargement of  the  EEC  by  Greece, 
Spa1n  and  Portugal',  Brussels  June  1977;  5:  M.A.Pizzut1,  'Polit1que 
mediterraneenne  de  la Grece',  colloque  'La Grece·et  la Communaute',  supra; 
6:  John  Marsh,  'The  impact  of enlargement  on  the  CAP'.  College  de  l'Europe 
Bruges  1978:  7:  N.Kyriazis  'Griechen  land:EG  - Beitritt:  Dynamisier-
ungsimpulse  und  Struktureffekte  fur  die Wirtschaft',  Forschunginstitut 
der Friedrich Ebert Stiftung No.  61,  Bonn  1978;  8:  N.Kyriazis,  'Griechenlands 
Beirtitt zur  EG:  Auswirkungen  auf die Industrialisierung',  Bonn  1979. 
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The  Greek  fl0et  1s  the  largest of  the  Member  States  fleets  and 
the  second  largest  1n  the  world,  after the  fleet  of L1beria.  If 
the  many  tankers  belong1ng  to  Greek  sh1powners  wh1ch  sa1l  under  the 
Liber1an  flag  are  included  in the  Greek  fleet  (as  part of  the  Greek 
owned  fleet)  then 1t 1s  the  largest  in  the  world.  In  m1d.  1981  the 
Greek  fleet  had  a  total  d1splacement of  71,6  m1ll.  dwt,  out  of  wh1ch 
28  m1o  dwt  were  bulk  carriers  (39%),  29,9  m1o  dwt  tankers  (42%)  and 
13,6  m1o  dwt  cargo carr1ers  (19%  of  the  total) 1 . 
The  Commun1ty's  fleet,  follow1ng  Greece's  adhes1on  represents 
about  one  fourth  of  the  world fleet,  thereby  making  the  Commun1ty 
1nd1sputably  the  Lcad1ng  mercant1le  mar1ne  power  1n  the  world. 
The  merchant  fleet is one  of the  most  1mportant  sectors  of  the  Greek 
economy  both  in  terms  of employment  (approximately  120,000  persons)  and  1n 
terms  of 1ts contribution  towards  the  Greek  balance of  payments  (approximately 
700  million dollars  in  1976,  which  correspond to  20%  of  the  balance of 
payments  defic1t  for  the  same  year. 
The  Greek  fleet  showed  great resilience dur1ng  the  international crisis 
in  the  sector  and  cont1nued  to develop while  the  fleets  of other Member 
States were  reduced.  The  Greek  merchant navy  is  fac.ing  undermanning problems 
because  jobs  available  on  Greek  ships  outnumber  the persons  seeking employment 
in th1s  market.  That  is why,  foreign  crews  are  employed  on  Greek  ships. 
However,  there is  a  Greek  law  proh1biting the  number  of foreigners  employed 
1n  the  crews  of ships  sa1l1ng  under  the  Greek  flag  from  exceeding one-quarter 
of the  crew.  So  the  manpower  problem  on  Greek  ships  has  not been solved. 
It 1s  doubtful whether  the  problem will  be  solved by  the possibility of 
employing  crewmembers  from  Member  States  (who,  with  the  free  movement  of 
labour,are  considered  as  Greeks  by  Greek  law)  because  the working  conditions 
on  Greek  ships  (salaries,  living conditions,  etc.)  are worse  than  corresponding 
conditions  in the Member  States'merchant fleets.  So  there  is  no  incentive 
for  se~men from  other Member  States  to  look  for work  on  Greek  ships. 
1 
See  table ' 3. 
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TABLE  3 
THE  TOP  TEN  MERCHANT  FLEETS  m1d.  1981 
II 
I  Dry 
I  II  I  I  General  I  I  II  I  I 
:Total  Fleet  m.dwt  Bulk Carriers 
I  m.dwt 
II  Tankers 
I  m.dwt 
I  Cargo  Carriers 
I  m.dwt  I  II  I  I  '  I  I  II 
I  I  II 
I  I  II 
I  I  II 
:LIBERIA  147.4  LIBERIA 
I  36.1 
II  LIBERIA  105.2 
I  GREECE 
I  13.6  I  II  I  I 
I  I  II  I  I 
:GREECE  71.6  GREECE 
I  28.0 
II  JAPAN  32-.0  I  PANAMA 
I  12.8  I  II  I  I 
I  II  I  I 
JAPAN  57.8  JAPAN 
I  19.4 
II  GREECE  29.9 
I  USSR 
I  7.8  I  II  I  I 
I  II  I  I 
PANAMA  41.7  PANAMA  13.3 
II  NORWAY  27.1 
I  USA 
I  6.9  II  I  I 
II  I  I 
UK  39.0  UK  8.9 
II  UK  25.9 
I  JAPAN 
I  6.2  II  I  I 
II  I  I 
NORWAY  37.1  NORWAY  8.0 
II  us  17.1 
I  LIBERIA 
I  6.1  II  I  I 
II  I  I 
us  24.4  ITALY  5.3  "  PANAMA  15.7 
I  CHINA 
I  5.1  II  I  I 
II  I  I 
FRANCE  19.6  CHINA  3.9 
II  FRANCE  15.6 
I  UK 
I  4.2  " 
I  I 
I 
II  I  I 
USSR 
I  17.1  INDIA  3.3 
II  ~rTALY  9.5  '  SINGAPORE 
I  3.4  I  I  II  I  I 
I  I  II  I  I 
ITALY 
I  16.0 
I  SINGAPORE  2.5 
II  SPAIN  9.3 
I  W.GERMANY 
I  2.9  I. 
" 
NOTES:  (l)  Tankers,  gas  carriers and  dry bulk carr1ers  of  10,000  dwt  plus  general  cargo carr1ers  includ1ng 
convent1onal  and  un1t1sed  tonnage  of  5,000  dwt  plus. 
(il)  Tankers  includes  gas  carr1ers  and  50%  of  combined carriers.  Dry  bulk  carr1ers  1ndluces  50%  of 
comb1ned carr1ers. 
Source:  LR  Computer 
...... 
C".. Following  access~on,  Greek  sailors  are entitled to take  advantage  of 
the  free  movement  of  labour  to seek  employment  on  ships  of Member  States. 
If they  do  this  to  any  great extent,  then  the  situat~on on  the  Greek  labour 
market  w~ll be  aggravated even  further.  Whether or not this will happen 
~n the  coming  years  depends  to  a  large  degree  on  wage  levels  on  the ships  of 
Member  States.  As  the  following  tablersho~ 
differences. 
there  are quite  s~gn~ficant 
Table  4 
Seamen's  monthly  salaries in English pounds,  December  1975 
Country  Mate  Seaman  GNP/per  capita  GNP/per  cap~ta 
as  % of  Greek  salaries 
Belgium  1.079,49  5 30,20  4.650  259,8 
France  1.207,46  433,83  4.900  273,8 
Germany  1.108,00  615,16  5.610  313,4 
Denmark  1.190,20  618,31  5.460  305,1 
Italy  724,23  399,57  2.510  140,3 
England  806,36  310,42  3.100  173,2 
Holland  786,45  407,09  4.410  246,4 
Greece  700,00  240,00  1.790  100,00 
Table  ') 
Country  Mate  Seaman  Mate  Seaman 
Al  B2 
Belgium  154  221  4,76  2,34 
France  173  181  5,06  1,82 
Germany  158  256  4,05  2,25 
Denmark  170  258  4,47  2,32 
Italy  104  167  5,92  3,27 
England  115  129  3,12  2,06 
Holland  112  129  3,66  1,89 
Greece  100  100  4,69  2,75 
l.  A:  In  these  two  columns  the  salary of mates  and  seamen  of Member 
States  ~s  calculated as  a  percentage of corresponding  Greek  salaries. 
2.  B:  Relationship of the  annual  salary  of  a  mate  and  a  seaman  to  the 
per  capita  GNP  ofthe  respective  country. 
Source:  I.G.Tzoannos  'The  Greek  merchant  fleet  and  the  EEC', 
IOBE,  Athens  1977,  pp.  25-28. 
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salaries  CO•-:J,_)arec~  :o  .::he  cos::.  of  living of each  coun.::.zy,  for  Hh.ich  ,:m·:~:)OS e 
the  ~er caplca G:l 0  lS  taken  as  an  a~prox1mate lndicato:c),  ~he difference 
~s  muc~ less.  "'l::~ln  che  contexc:  of  the  Greek  economy,  Greek  sallors 
States.  ~urche:coo~e,  satlo:.:-s  f:com  th1rd countrles,  Hhere  .::he  salarles 
are  r.mcl1  lover  can  1mc:<.:  :;_n  ·,:he  English,  Ducch  and  Gee-man  fleets. 
?lnally,  when  net  salaries are  taken  into account, the difference becomes 
even  s~alle:c  ~ecause  ne~ salaries in  ~ember States  are  on  average  25% 
lm1er  .::han  g·coss  salar1es,  1r1hile  in  Greece  ~::1ey  are  only  10%  lm;er. 
?rom  1975  onwar~s.  salarles  tn  che  Greek  merchan~ navy  ~ncreased more 
rap1dly  .::han  Ln  those  of  Member  States because  the  demand  on  ~he part of 
shi{Jmme cs  .i nc.ceasec'  oHing  co  ::he  grm1ing  s1ze  o£  .:he  Gree:c  flee.:  Hhlle, 
on  ::::v;  con.:carj  I  de,~lanC.  ln  ':he  fleets  of  fliem::,er  States  was  dimlnlsh:;_ng 
w1th  ::he  dinin~shlng capaci::y of  cheir  flee::s. 
~part from  the  level of  wages,  other  factors  also  influence moblllty 
of  labour  such  as  the  cost of  £indlng  out  about  employment  opportunltles 
(which  is greater  when  the  person  seeklng  employment  leaves  h1s  own 
country),  way  of  llfe,  the difficulty of  adapt1ng  to  dlfferent  llVlng 
conditlons  on  forelgn  shlps,  the  difficulties of communicating  in  foreign 
languc:cges,  e::c. 
Openlngs  for  employment  on  forelgn  shlps  should  not  therefore  crea~e 
ser1ous  manpower  problems  in  the  Greek  merchant  navy. 
The  implemen~atLon of  Communlty  legislation  1n  the  Greek  merchant 
navy  may  1ncrease  the  cost  of  movlng  Greek  sh1ps:  l.  because  the  Community 
lays  down  more  rigorous  safety speclflcatlons  for  ships  and  checks  in 
connectlon  with  them.  2.  Because  the  trend  towards  the equlllzatlon of 
soc1al  henefi~s for  seafare~lS lncreasing  labour  costs  on  ships. 
Iloweve:::,  labour  costs  account  for  only  a  small  part of  the  total  cos~ 
which  varies  h2·t,;een  25%  for  ships  of  between  20,000  and  25,000  ::annes 
ann~,% for  s:·nps  o.hove  300,000  c:onnes.  In other  wo:::ds,  labour  cost  are 
inve:::sely  ~roportional to the  s1ze  of  the  ship1 .  Thus  an  1ncrease  of  10% 
2n  the  labour  costs  on  ships  of  between  20,000  ::a  25,000  tonnes  increases 
the  total cost by  2.5%  and  in  shlps  of  more  than  300,000  cannes  by  0.4% 
1 
See  !.G.Tzoannos,  o~.c1c. 
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modernLzed  because  the  average  age  of  the  ships  LS  qu1'ce  high  and  more 
'  I  h'  1  than  the  average  age  of  Memoer  States  s  Lps  HQwever,  mode~nization of 
sh1ps  means  cost  rcductlons  in  o~her sectors  (such  as  fuel,  because  more 
modern  engines  arc  more  economical)  and  a  greater  degree  of  automation, 
which  will  help  to  solve  the  manpower  problem. 
Access1on  ·to  the  Communi.::y  means  some  increased cost  for  che  Greek 
fleet,  but  it glves it the  chance  to  compete  on  equal  terms  with  the other 
fleets  of  ~1ember States  and  the posslbillty of taking  common  protection 
measures,  should  the  need arise,  againsc  competition  (often  not  regular 
competLtJ.on  ~  dumplng)  of  third countr1es  Eastern countries  in particular. 
3.  Regional  ~Olley. 
On  the  J.n~lementdt~on of  che  Community's  reg1onal  policy  in Greece 
chere  LS  a  protocol  similar to Ptotocol  30  in  respect of  Ireland.  The 
Commun1cy's  regional  policy  supports  and  streng~hens Greek  regional  policy 
(as  is  che  case  in the other  Member  States).  Ald  from  the  Reg1onal  Fund 
(FEDER)  and  the  European  Investmenc  Ban]<  (EIB)  J.S  provided only  for  projects 
supported by  Greek  reg~onal pol1cy. 
Greece  has  been  divided  into  4  regions,  denoted by  the  letters A,  B, 
C  and  D,  according  to the  degree  of their industrial  development.  Region  A 
lncludes  che  Lndustrially  developed  reg1ons  of Achens  and  Thessaloniki, 
reg1on  D  the  least developed  (essentlally  under-develo~ed)  regions,  such 
as  the  fron~ler  reg~ons.  B  and  C  include  intermediate  regions. 
Depending  upon  the  reg1on,  lnvestmenc  incent1ves  are  strong,  moderate 
or non-exlstent  (as  ln  the  case  of  A).  Conseguencly,  the  Greek  and 
Communjty  reglonal  policy  is  concentra~ing lcs  ma1n  weight  ~n the  D  and  c 
reg1ons. 
ElB  resources  can  be  available  for  region  A  only  when  they  are  to be 
used  for  excremely  importan~ structural work,  i.e.  for  the  cons~rucc1on 
of  a  new  international  airport  in  Spata  because  Athens  present  a~rport is 
too  small  co  meet  ~he new  demands  of  aLr  connectlons  Wlth  Athens  and  1~ 
c0uld  no~ be  extended because  chere  was  a  densely bullt-up area  surround1ng 
it. 
l  The  average  age  of  Greek  ships  is:  21.61  for  chose  becween  100  and 
8,000  tonne~;,  1.3.31  for  those  be'CHeen  8,000  and  15,000  tonnes,  11.69 
for  those  becwccn  15,000  and  30,000  tonnes  ~nd 6.89  for  ~hose above 
30,000  tonnes. 
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1.  There  is  a  large concenciat1on of  econom1c  ac~ivicy  (bach  industr1al 
and  services)  in  a  few  large  towns,  mainly  in Achens  - P1raeus  and  in 
ThessalonD.l. 
2.  According  co  regional  development  indexes,  there  are  sign1ficanc 
r~gional dlfferences  (per capita GNP,  e~ploymen~ 1n  agriculture, 
unemployment) . 
3.  The  regional  differences  are  on  the  increase. 
4 .. ·  L~w-level of  interdependence  between  regions  and,  in  some  cases,  wi~h 
~he centre resulting in the  phenomenon  of  'subsis~ence level  auta~cy' 
in certain regions1
. 
Al chough  Greece  has  a  lower  per  capL:a  GNP  ··chan  che  C'ommunlcy  average, 
_regional  difference within Greece,  ( taJdng  -che  per  capita GNP  index)  are 
no"c  rauch  less  ·than  those  in  che  Mer,1ber  States of the  EEC,  even  when  compared 
co  the most  developed  scates  like  Germany.  As  the  following  cable  shows, 
1ncome  dJ[fe~ences between  the  richest  and  the  poorest  region  ln  Greece  are 
ln  t~e  ra~lo of  2.8:1,  while  1n  Italy  thej  are  2.6:1  and  in  Germany  2.5:1. 
The  diffe:;:-ence  be·cween  che  Community's  t::>oores::  region  (in  Ireland)  and  1cs 
riches'c  reg1on  ( ln  Gerwc.ny)  lS  1:9.  These  figu:;:-es  are  not  altered by 
Greece's  accession  s~nce  che  difference  between  Gr~ece~. poorest  region  and 
che  Comnmnity's  r1ches.::  region  is 1:8.72 . 
Table  6 
Country  GlJP/pe£  capica  GHP/1 :ter  cap1·ca  Ra-cio 
!.average  2_{1  2.  .Lm1es t  3 .  Eighes·c  2  :  3 
G.:o;~man  marl•s 
Germany  11.300  7090  17.480  1  2,5 
France  10.450  7060  lLL 450  l  2,1 
Belgi.:tm  9.8::30  6540  10.390  1  1,7 
i-iolland  8.8]0  6400  10.010 
1  1,6  .L 
I::<:' ly  0.310  3220  C.t.:50  l  2,6 
~~ncJlanc  7.390  6270  3.790  1  1,4. 
Gt~GC4Ce  4..200  2100  6.000  1  2,8 
-~.:;c  - 9  9.0130  3220  17.480  l  5  L'  1.  '. 
~cc  - 10  2100  17.480  1  C,7 
------- ~-~- --· ---- -
1.  lilth  I:-·~laod" s  ctCCt2SSlOn  the  c.iffe~ence became  1:9  .Ln  ~;1e  Co.,mun::  .  .-c.y  of  9. 
l 
2 
Sou.ccc:  D.  ::lleill  ''l''l,"'  i ml)ac c  of  enlc:  ·:fJei:ten::.  oa  reCj ional  c~eve  lo,:Joen·.:: 
and  reg1onal  pol1cy  .n  cne  ~c·,  3ruges,  2·  21. 
See  Table  1!  - 5  o[  c~e  s.::at1s~ical  annex. 
See  D. 3u~hl  ''I'he  utpact  of  enlargement· on  reg1onal  O.evelopmen·c  anc 
~e~-'-ona.l  ~olicy 1n  the  JC',  College  d'Curopj  Bruges  1978,  p.  19  and 
Nikos  Vliamos,  Nlkos  Kyriazfu  ·~c:  Jegional pol1cy  and  Gree~ real1cy', 
Ndlcemborikl  19.7.78. 
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regionel  d1fferences  are  seen  co  be  greater.  There  was  a  high  rate of  under-
eQployment  in  some  regions  and  of mig£ation  from  those  regions  to the  larger 
centres  a'c  home  and  abroad.  Underemployment  can  be  calcula'ced by  the 
following  mechod:  ~~e  knm-;  what  ·the  employment  levels are  in  agricul'cure, 
industry  and  the  services  and  v.'e  knmJ  what  the  GNP  1s.  Th~se  two  figures 
can  be  used  to calculate  the  p£oductivicy  in each  sector  (average)  and  to 
ma~e comparisons  becween  sec~orq.  If productivity in  each  sector equals  1, 
chen it equals  the  producc1vi·ty  of  ·the  whole  economy.  However,  if a  sector's 
productiv1ty is  considerably less  than  l,  this  can  be  seen  as  an  indicator 
of  underemployment  in that  sector.  The  result,for Greece  is:  (productivity 
by  sector)  agriculture  0.45,  industry 1.3,  services 1.5,  Thus  it appears  that 
there is significant underemployment  in agriculture.  llideremployment  in  the 
agricultural regions  of Greece,  such  as  Epiros,  certain provinces  of Macedon1a, 
Thessaly,  the  Peloponnese  and  Thrace,  are  correspondingly  higher than average. 
Consequently,  the  main  ·cask  of  the  na'cional  and  Community  reg1onal 
policy  is  to  create operungs  for  employmen'c  in  chese  reg1ons  vnth 
1ndustrial  lnvestrnents  or  investments  in the  services  sector  (ma1nly 
tour1sm). 
Accession  may  have  adverse effects  on  regional  development  in Greece 
because  1ncreased competition h1ts,  for  the  most  part,  ~he small 1  less-
efficien~ undertakings.  Yet,  to  a  large extent,  these  are  the  k1nd  of 
undercakings  which  ex1st  in  the  less-developed regions  of Greece.  The 
closure  of  these  undertakings  because  of  1ncreased competition  may  intensify 
the  employment-underemployment-unemploymenc  problem in ·these  regions. 
'fhe  a1ds  from  the  Commun:i:cy' s  rtegional  Fund  and  the  EIB  are  not. 
enough  to  coun~eract the  advarse  regional  consequences  of  access1on. 
Stronger  incent1ves  are  needed  1n  the  field of  reg1onal  development. 
These  could take  che  form  of  reduc1ng  the  paymencs  which  workers  and 
employers  in  these  regions  have  to  make  to  stace  social  services  (insurance, 
medlcc,l  care,  e~cc.),  soft  loans,  some  tax  exempcions  and  s1mplifica'cion 
of  the  procedures  fn.c  the  grant1ng  of  loans  and  exemptions  in  these 
reg1ons. 
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prem1ums  (REP).  REP  have  the  advantage  that  they  do  not  d1scr1minate 
agains~ undertakings  already established in  che  underdeveloped regions  as 
do  other  incentives which  are  granced only  to  newly-founded  undertak1ngs. 
He  also proposes  a  system of  differential wages  tax  (the  lowest. rate  in 
the  least developed  regions)  as  an  additional measure  to  investm~nt 
lncentives.  Unl1ke  investment  ince~tives which  only  affect capital,  th1s 
measure  has  the  advancag2  of  restor1ng  the  regional  DOlicy
1 s  balance  between 
·che  rpoduction  factors 
1 capi·cal'  and  'labour 
1
,  which  are  bo·ch  direc'cly 
affected by  regional policy measures1 . 
4.  Social policy 
The  European  Parl1ament  adopted  the  Commission 
1 s  proposal  cha'c  Greece 
should be  1ncluded  amongsc  ·those  countries  wh1ch  rece1ve  h1gh  rates of 
assistance  from  the  European  Social  Fund,  with  the  excep~ion of  .:he  regions 
of  A~hens and  Thessalonlki. 
Since  1  January  Greece  has  been  represented by  12  Qembers  in  the 
Community's  :Zconomic  and  Social  Comm1ttee. 
S1nce  access1on  the  legal status of  G~eek wor~ers in  the  ~ember  Sta~es 
has  been  :im;?roved  J?Ursuant  to }J,rticles  48  and  51  of  the  Treacy  of  Rome. 
~  seven-year  trcnsit1onal  per1od  has  been  agreed for  che  full  implenentacion 
of  the  free  movement  of  labour,  but  greeks  who  are  already  1n  che  Member 
States rece1ve  the  same  treatment  as  the  workers  in  those  Member  Staces. 
Tnus,  for  example,  they  w1ll  receive  the  same  treatment  as  provided for 
:n  Di~ecc1ve 1408/71  of  che  Council  of Ministers  for  Social  Security2 
1. 
2 
See  B·ela  Balassa  'Structural policies  in  .:he  Europea.n  Comr,1on  l'-'iarl:et' 
in  Bela  Balassa,  op.clt.  p.  270 
S2e  ?  ..  I~ravarit:.ou  - r~lanita~.;:i  'Problemes  soc1au;~ ei:  adhes1on
1
,  :::ns::.icut 
~·§tu~es  Europ~ennes,  Univers1c~ L~bre de  Bruxelles,  collo~ue  'La  Gr~ce 
c·c  la Communauce', · tv,ay  1977. 
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Greece  jo1ned the  ECSC  on  1  January  1981  and  therefore  the  provis1ons 
of Art1cle  58  (man1fest  crisis  in the  steel  industry)  also  apply  in Greece. 
Accordingly  product1on  quotas  for various  steel products  have  been extended 
to Greek  steelworks.  Five  Greek  steelworks  con~ested the  implementation 
of Article  58  1n  the  European  Court  on  the  grounds  that the  quotas  for 
Greek  undertak1ngs  were  f1xed  before Greece's  accession,  in other words 
without  any  Greek  representatives  taking part  1n  the proceedings.  The 
European  Court  passed  judgement  1n  favour  of  the  Greek  undertakings,  deciding 
that the  Commission  and  the  Greek  undertak1ngs  should  hold  new negotiations 
to establish the  quotas  in question. 
The  pol1cy  of  f1x1ng  quotas  generally  favours  weaker  undertakings 
because,  w1th1n  the  l1rnits  of  the  production  quotas  granted to  them,  they 
are  safe  from  fore1gn  competition.  However,  the price is that the  very 
act  of-curb1ng  cornpetltJon  weakens  the  incent1ve  to modernize  and  improve 
production  eff1c1ency,  thereby  sustaining  the 1nef£icient structure of 
product1on. 
In  Greece  there  are  no  coal  deposits,  but  there  is  a  considerable 
amount  of  lign1te.  Lign1te  is  not  el1gible  for  f1nance  from  the  ECSC. 
On  the  Greek  side,  steps  have  been  taken  and  attempts  are  being  made  to 
have  l1gnite  included  in  the  ECSC's  financial  machinery  because  of the 
importance it has  for  Greece. 
Steel production  1n  1978  1n  Greece  was:  600,000  tonnes  of  iron and 
936,000  tonnes  of  steel  compared  to the  overall production of the  Ten  for 
the  same  perJod,  which  was  90.8  m1llion  tonnes  and  133.5  mill1on  tonnes 
respect1vely.  The  per  capita consumpt1on  of  steel  1n  Greece  1n  1978  was 
cons1derably  lower  than  the  Community  average. 
In  Greece  there  1s  one  steel un1t  Wlth  a  vert1cal  structure, 
'CHALIVOURGIKI'.  It has  two  blast furnaces  w1th  a  total product1on 
capacity  of  l  m1ll1on  tonnes  per  year.  There  are  a  further  5  compand.es 
which  produce  cast  1ron  from  scrap.  Another  com~any uses  co1ls  and 
ra1lway  tracks  as  raw  material  for  producing  fin1shed  iron procucts. 
There  are  also  a  number  of  small  undertak1ngs  whose  overall  ~reduction 
1  capac1ty  1s  no  more  ~han 50,000  tonnes  per  year 
Desp1te  the  fact  that  Greek  1ron  ore  reserves  are  estimated at 
220  m1ll1on  tonnes,  1ron ore  is  not  exported  from  Greece  because it 1s 
of  poor  qual1ty  (low  1ron content,  approx1mately  35  - 50%  compared  co 
60'  1n  imported  iron  ore,  h1gh  content of  substances  l1ke  sulphur, 
phosphorus,  etc.  which  makes  the  smelt1ng  expens1ve) 2 . 
1  See  ETBA  'Anatomy  of  Greek  1ndustry',  Athens  1976,  pp.  468-9 
2  Ib.td,  pp.  12-15 
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(approx1mately  70-75%  of  totaJ  im~orts)  and  25-30%  by  old iron  from  Greece 
1tself. 
Greece  is  a  net exporter of  steel products,  with  exports  reaching 
42%  of  production  in  1975.  In  recent years  Japanese  penetration on  the 
Greek  market  has  1ncreased  (as  in the markets  of  the  Member  s·tates) 
replac1ng,  to  a  certain degree,  previous  imports  from  Member  States. 
The  p~rcentage of  Japanese  imports  into the  Greek  market  rose  from  33% 
in  1975  to  43%.in  1976,  while  the  percentage  of  imports  from  countries  in 
the  rest of  the  world  for  the  same  period rose  from  8%  in  1975  to  12%  1n 
1976. 
As  1n  the  other  Member  States,  the crisis in this sector has  resulted 
in  the  underemr_:>loyment  of  Greek  steeelworks  so  that  they  are operating  a'c 
50  - 70%  of  their capac1ty. 
Other  features  of  the  steel 1ndustry  1n  Greece:  the  sector's  labour 
cost 1s  a?proximately  100%  higher  than  the  average  for  Greek  industry,  the 
cap1tal cost is about  average  and  che  cost of  raw macerials  is  ~pproximately 
25%  lower  than  the  average  for  Greek  industry1 
6.  The  free  movement  of  workers 
A  seven-year transitional per1od  has  been  agreed  for  the  implementat1on 
of  che  free  movement  of  workers  because certain Member  s·ta'ces  (particularly 
Hest  Germany)  were  afraid that there vmuld  be  an  immediate  r1se  in  the  number 
of  Greek  workers  migrating  to  those  countr1es  and  because  Greek  is  a  precedent 
for  Spain  and  Portugal  w1th  the1r  large  labour  forces. 
These  feurs  are  unfounded  because  4  years  ago  the  number  of  Greeks 
return1ng  to Greece  exceeded  the  number  of  those  em1grating.  In  1978 
there  were  166,000  Greeks  working  in  the  Nernber  Sta·ces,  mainly  in  ~les·t 
Germany. 
At  the  end  of  the  seven-year transitional period,  members  of the 
profess1ons  from  che  Member  States  (i.e.  doctors,  dent1sts,  midw1ves,etc.) 
w1ll  be  encitled  to  pracc1se  1n  Greece.  If  a  s1gnificant  number  of 
profess1onal  persons  IJccome  established  1n  Greece,  compe-c1·c1on  1n  this 
sector w1ll  1ncrease  cons1derably  and  perhaps  there will  be  employment 
problems  in these  specialities. 
Hm;ever,  there  does  no'c  alJpear  to be  any  real  danger  of  'chis  happening 
as  certain  factors,  such  as  language,  the particular living and working 
conditions  and  the  generally  lower  level  of  salaries  and  incomes  mil1ta~e 
against  i:his. 
1 
See  S~atistical Annex,  Table  II 
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Since  l  January  1981  the  Co~mun1ty  sys~em of  own-resources  has  applied 
to  Greece  with  some  temporary  structural adjustments  which  provide  for  mechanisms 
des1gned  to  ensure  that  Greece  is  a  net  benef1c1ary  rather  than  a  net 
contr1butor  to  the  Commun1~y budget. 
As  from  l  January  1981  Greece  has  to  pay  its full  contr1bu~ions  ~awards 
the  Community  budget  based  on  the  Greek  GNP  (because  VAT  has  st1ll not  been 
ln~roduced 1n  Greece).  However,  the  Commun1ty  will return part of  these 
contr1but1ons:  70%  of  the  total payment  in 1981,  50%  1n  1982,  30%  in 1933 
20%  1n  1984  and  10%  1n  1985.  From  1986  onwards  Greece  will  not  rece1ve  any 
f··.,t:ther  reimbursement. 
In  accordance  wi·ch  che  SJ}cth  Directive  concern1ng  the  common  VAT  system, 
VAT  has  co  be  1ncroduced  1n  Greece  by  1983.  It lS  to replace  a  number  of 
consumer  taxes  which  have  relatively lim1ted scope  (such  as  turnover tax,  e~c). 
In  order  'co  avo.1.d  creat1ng  f1nanc1al  problems  for  ·the  state budge'c,  the 
level  of  VJ.T  for  Greece  mus c  be  f1xed  in  such  a  way  cha·;:  it produces  more  or 
less the  sam6  revenue  for  che  state  as  the  taxes  which it lS  to replace. 
However,  care  w1ll  also need  to  be  caken  co  ensure  that the  lntroduction  of 
VAT  does  no~  h~ve unfavourable effects  on  consumption  (pr1ce  1ncreases)  and 
on  J.nf lation. 
I~  should  also  be  po1nted out  chac  ind1rect  caxes,  such  as  VAT,  are  much 
more  1mportanc  for  the  state budget  in Greece  than  direct  taxes.  (In  1976 
che  rac10  of  ind1rect  caxes  ~o d1recc  taxes  was  70:30%.)1 
8.  Frc2  movement  of  ca~1tal 
A  (Jve-yc2r  crans1tional  period  has  been  agreed before  ~he free  movement 
of  cap1cal  1s  final~y Implemented  Jn  Greece.  Nevertheless,  even  a~  che  enri 
''l  che  tranbltlonal  per1od  Member  St~ces w1ll still be  able  co  restrict the 
ex~ort 0f  c&p~tal Jn  a  number  of  ways,  such  as  exchange  concrols,  etc. 
?ranee  and  Belgium,  for  inscance,  make  use  of  a  system of  chis  kind. 
1  See  A?os~olou,  AndEeas  'The  G~ee~  ~ax system'  unpubl1shed  study  by  ~he 
Min1scry  of  ~conom1cs,  P  . .::he11s  1976.  Georgc:!•o~:Joulos,  an  i>.thens  Un1versity 
professor carried out  an  1n-depth  study  on  the  lmplementation of  VAT  ih 
Greece:~  i·o.c  che  Gree:~ l'anjstry  o£  Sconomics,  ,11.1:hens  1930. 
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no.:  been  studied  adequac:ely  and  no  1n-depc.h  scudy  is needed.  The  following 
ou.:line  should be  seen  as  a  ~relim1nary step.in  this direct1on. 
The  distinguishing  feature  of  Greek  pol1cy  so  far  has  been its efforts  ~o 
actract  forelgn  capical  for  invesL:ment  by  offering part1cularly  favourable 
condicions.  Nothing will  change  1n  ch1s  seccor  as  a  result of  accession  to 
the  Community  because  Greece  became  inc~easingly o~en as  1t stepped up  its 
effor~s to  introduce  foreign  cap1tal.  Consequencly,  Lhere  is  no  reason  to 
e:~pect  increased  fore1gn  investmenc  in Greece  jusc because  of  access1on. 
As  to  whe~her foreign  investment  1n  Greece  w1ll  depend  upon  other  faccors 
which  make  such  1nvestmenc  attracL:ive  for  foreign  ca~ital,  e.g.  large profi.: 
escimac.es,  level  of  che  cost of  facc.ors  o£  produccion  (ca~1cal,  labour,  energy, 
raw mater1als),  brc~CLh of  the  market,  presence  of  raw  mac.erials,  ex1stence 
of  infrastructure,  dist&nce  from  consumer  cencres  and  transJort  cases,  general 
economic  cl1mate  (stabil1ty of  economic  JOlicy,  rate  of  inflation),  loan 
?Ossib1l1t1es,  general  pol1tical climate  (pol1c~cal stab1l1cy  and  firm  guarantees 
co  fore1gn  ca~ital  cha~ 1nvestments  will  not  be  nat1onalized,  etc.).  Insofar 
as  some  o£  ;:he  1nccntLves  in  Greece  have  been  or  1rnll  h.:::ve  co  ~Je  c;.bolished 
£ollovnng  acccss1on  because  .:hey  conflicc  W1);h  the  Commun1 cy' s  regulac.1.ons 
on  COIJ,?ecl cion  (such  as  expor·t  and  product.  ion  subsid1.es),  access:..on  may  make 
Greece  l·2ss  acc:cacclve  for  £ore1.gn  capital  1.nvestmenc.  Hhat  may  happen,  to 
some  extent,  ls  cl1at  the  soucces  supply1ng  the  fore1gn  cap1~al may  change, 
wich  Euro~can and  Japanese  cap1cal  ce~lacing Amecican  capl~al  co  a  cercain 
degree.  The  Japanese  1n  part1.cular  may  use  invesc.ment  1n  Greece  as  a  Means 
of  reaching  .:he  Eu.copean  market,  s1nce  products  £:;:-om  Japanese  companies 
(or  joint venc.ures  o£  Greek-Japanese  or  Gree!c-Arab  companies)  which  are  made 
1.n  Greece  will  be  able  to  enter  the  markets  of  ~he Member  States  Wl~houc 
duc1es  and  without  guoca  restricLions. 
On  che  o~her hand,  free  movement  of capital will  open  up  new  poss1b1lities 
(to  a  greater or  smaller  degree  depending  upon  the  pos1.tion  which  Greek 
governments  adopt  after the transitional period)  for  Greek  1nvestors  wh1ch 
they  did  not  have  before  because  ~here were  t1ght controls  and  restrict1ons 
on  the  export  ol  Greek  capital  from  Greece.  As  to whether  Greek  investors 
ma!ce  usc  of  this  right  on  a  large  scale,  in other  words  whether  exports  of 
Greek  capital  to  Member  States w1ll  be  sign1ficant,  depends  upon  a  number 
of  factors: 
1.  the  investors'  economic  class, 
2.  the  level  of capital  ava1lable  for  investment  w1th1n  each  class, 
3.  investment  incent1ves, 
4.  alternat1ve  investment  possib1l1t1es. 
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Industrialists.  The  cap1tal  which  they  have  available  for  investment  is 
signif1cant,  but  the cap1tal  of  the  shipowners  in part1cular  has  never  been 
subject  co  nat1onal  restr1ctions  and  could  always  be  moved  outside Greece. 
Free  movement'of  cap1tal existed before  for  ~h1s econom1c  class  so that 
accession will  not  alter the  movement  of capital controlled by  this class. 
The  econom1c  class  1mmcd1ately  below  the  top  class consists of  the 
remain1ng  industrialists  and  certain wealchy  1nd1v1duals  with  operat1ons  1n 
other  sectors  (tourism,  banks,  Insurance  companies,  etc.).  This  class also 
has  a  s1gnificant  and  reasonably  concentrated  amount  of  1nvestment capital. 
As  a  rule  the  family  nature  of  Greek  undertakings  limits  and restricts the  use 
of this capital.  For  th1s  econom1c  class available  investment capital is 
completely  l1rn1ted  to  1nvestment  in  the  fam1ly  undercak1ng.  It seems  that 
individuals  In  this  class  never  even  cons1der  investing  outside  the  family 
undertaking.  Consequently,  hardly  any  increase  in  Greek  exports  of  investment 
capital is  l1kely to be  made  by  th1s class. 
The  lowest  econom1c  class  brings  together the  remaining  1nvestors  whose 
backgrounds  Hhow  grPat  variety  (tndcpendent  prnfessJonals,  employees  1n  all 
categor1cs,  workers,  etc.).  Th1s  1s  the class of  essent1al  net creditors 
of  every  economy  (because  the  other  two  classes  are,  as  a  rule,  net  borrowers) 
and,  overall,  1t has  the  most  1mportant  amount  of  1nvestment capital  in all 
economies.  However,  th1s  cap1tal  1s  not  concentrated amongst  a  few  decislon-
making  1ndividuals but  is dispersed  among  many  persons  each  of  whom  has  only 
a  small  amount  of  Investment  capital. 
Following  accessio~  ~h1s economic  class  w1ll  be  afforded new  investment 
opportun1cies  wh1ch  it d1d  noc  have  before.  The  behaviour  of this  economic 
class will  determine  whether  there is  any  significant export capital. 
There  are  basically  two  Incentives  for  1nvestmenc:  the  insurance  mocive 
and  che  speculation motive.  I~ is of  course  qu1te  difficul~ to  d1s~1nguish 
between  these  cwo  moc1vcs  In  many  cases.  Nevertheless,  the  1nsurance mot1ve, 
is,  on  the  whole,  predominant  amongst  investors  1n  this class  and  as  a  result 
chcy  prefer  to  inv~st  tn  low-return,  low-r1sk  optlons. 
The  alternat1ves  open  to  these  1nvestors  are  st1ll  LO  be  stud1ed. 
Essent1ally they  are  as  follo~~s:  deposit1ng  in  a  bank  or  sim1lar  institut1on 
Investing in  che  money  market,  property  Invescment  (houses,  land,  preclous 
metals,  works  of  art,  etc.).  These  3  basic categories  become  6  If divided 
on  the  basis  of  investment  at  home  and  abroad.  In  this  way  1nvesting  ln  shares 
in  forelgn  companies  on  the  Greek  stock market,  as  long  as  the  capical  1s 
not  Invested  ln Greece,  and  buying  Horks  of  art  imported  1nto  the  Greek 
market  can  be  cons1dered  as  invescment  abroad  (exporc  of  cap1tal). 
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and  the  f1nal  dcstjnation of  ~he capital  invesced  racher  chan  the place  where 
it was  bought.  On  che  other hand,  deposits  1n  fore1gn  banks  with branches 
and  operations  1n  Grecre  cannot  be  cons1dered  as  exporced cap1tal  insofar 
us  these  banks  rc1nvc~_;c.  the  cap1 tal in  the  Greek  economy. 
S1nce  'che  invescmcnt  1ncencive  1n  ~he econom1c  class  that  we  are 
study1ng  cends  to  be  the  1nsurance  motive,  'che  ~nods of  inves"i:.men'c  which 
are  generally chosen  do  noc  1nvolve  any  major  bus1ness  risks  and  y1eld 
llmited returns.  Thus,  these  investors  prefer  co  deroslt  1n  ~he banking 
system  and,  secondly,  in property.  Investment  in  the  money  market  is  less 
attractive because  the  danger  of  losing or partly  losing the cap1tal  is 
greater,  particularly vvhen  one  compares  th?  developmen·t  of  the  Greek  money 
market  1n  recent  years  - character1zed by  nominal  stagna~1on or even  nom1nal 
reduction  in  the  value  of  many  securit1es  - with  the  corcesponding  rap1d 
growth  <;>f  inflation  vvhl.ch  mec,ns  a  s1gn1f1cant  re<ll  reduc-.::1on  1n  che  value 
of  these  secur1ties. 
Investors  1n  ~hls class could choose  the  fore1gn  shares market.  If 
such  funds  were  ~o enter  the  Greek  money  market,  perhaps  markets  of  this k1nd 
vwuld  1n  fact  make  an  ap'-::Jearance.  However,  such  a  develoi)ment  will  not  be  any 
of  any  great  1mportance  because,1  1n  -.:he  f1rst  place,  there  1s  not  enough 
capital ava1lable,  on  the  Greek  money  market  and  the  Greek  stock exchange 
co  make  1t actractive  co  foreign  companies  co  in~ro6uce  che1r  shares  onco 
lt and,  1n  the  second  place,  because  Greek  inves~ors in  this class will  be 
hes1tant  (probab~y very  hes1tant)  about  the  shares  of  foreign  companies 
chac  are  unknown  1n  Greece  s1nce  chey  will  not  be  Ln  a  pos1c1on  to  apprec1ate 
the  degree  of  economic  solvency  and  securicy offered by  these  foreign 
company  shc,res. 
Investors  w1ll  be  able  co  1nvcst in  che  scock  markets  of  Member  Scates. 
However,  ch1s  k1nd  of  investment  involves  greater cost  for  the  invescor 
(mainly  the  cost  of  acquir1ng  1nformation  and  follow1ng  developmen:s)  and 
grearer  uncercainty  (bccaus~ h1s  knowledge  of·the  econom1c  situat1on  1n  ~he 
Member  Scates will  not  be  as  good  as  his  knowledge  of  the  Greek  econom1c 
situation  and  h1s  forcasts  about  fucure  dev~lopmencs w1ll  cherefore  be  less 
certain).  Thus  1t  lS  posslblc to conclude,  given  chac  the  amount  of 
capital ava1laole  co  inves~ by  each person  1n thls class  lS  relac1vely small, 
chat  they will  not  ma!(e  great use  of  the possibili:y of  1nves~ing in  fore1gn 
s cocl(  exchanges. 
The  small  amount  of  ava1lable capical  1n  conJunction  w1ch  ~he h1gher  cost 
and  the greater  r1sk  and  uncercaincy  almosc  completely  exclude  chls 
poss1billcy. 
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is  lower  ~nflat~on  (greater  monetary  stabil~ty)  is in  keep~ng with  the 
insurance  motive  and  there  could be  increased export  of  capital  for  th~s 
reason.  Nevertheless,  here  ~oo the  h1gher  cost  (of  ge~ting information 
and  following  developments)  lS  off-putt1ng.  Moreover,  as  these·lnvestments 
can  be  considered  ~nd~rcct,  unl1ke  direct  investments  1n  the  stock  exchange, 
there  ~s more  chance of  their  be~ng restricted or  even  blocked  by  the 
Greek  State. 
Investments  ~n property,  works  of art,  gold,  etc.,  are not  considered 
as  investments  proper  like those  in  the  stock  exchange,  wh~ch means  that 
the  S'cate  will  have  more  power  to block  them.  The  state  ~s  empowered  to 
prohib~t investments particularly in precious metals,  as  happens  ~n  some 
Member  States  where  ~he market  in gold,  etc.,  is  not  a  free  one.  In  th1s 
case,  too,  the  h~gher cost of  investment  abro~d,  coupled with  the  Iow  level 
of  ava1lable  cap~tal,  act as  a  restra~nt. 
Thus  1t can  be  concluded  that  the  free  movement  of  cap~tal in  Greece 
will  not,  under  normal  c~rcumstances,  result  in  a  maJor  export  of  Greek 
cap1'cal  to Member  States.  Of  course  a  situat1on of  domest1c'  econom~c or 
pol1tical  ~nertia or crisis could strengthen  such  a  trend~. 
9.  Entry of  the  drachma  into the"European Monetary  System 
The  drachma,  l~ke the  Engl~sh pound  (which  nevertheless is  in the  EMS 
basket,  unlike  the  drachma)  has  not entered the  European  Monetary  System 
( E!A.S)  .  The  Greek  Govcrnmen'c  wj ll have  to  decide  ~n the  future  whether  the 
drachma  1s  to enter the  EMS,  perhaps  together  w~th the  entry of  the  peseta 
and  the  escudo,  when  Spain  and  Portugal enter  the  Community. 
The  drachma  has  already  been  1ntroduced into  the  Par~s stock  exchange 
but,  since  the  bidd~ng and  demand  for  drachmae  in Paris  1s  small  and  there 
are still t~ght exchange  contr6ls  in  Greece,  the  Bank  of Greece,  in 
coopera'c~on w11:h  the  Gr'eek  lVJonetary  Committee,  1s  continuing to  f1x  the  price 
of  the  drachma  as  before  1n  relation to  EUA  and  the  other currenc1es. 
1· See  N~kos  Kyr~az1s  'The  free  movement  of  cap~tal following  Greece's 
accession  to  the  EEC',  Naftembor~ki,  9  June  1979. 
- 40  -The  consequences  of  the  entry of  the  drachma  into the  EMS  have  not 
been  studied but  this  should  be  done  before  the  decision  on  the matter  is 
taken.  The  following  thoughts  should therefore  be  considered as  preliminary 
step  in this direction. 
The  EMS  has  operated satisfactorily up  till  now,  creating  a  region of 
monetary  stabil1ty which  ass1sts  exchanges  and  forcasts.  On  the  other 
hand,  in  the  same  period the  Greek  economy  has  been  characterized by  high 
rates of  inflation  (25%  in 1980)  wtth  a  corresponding fall  in the  value of 
the  drachma  in relation to  the  EUA  (20%  from  March  1979  to March  1980)  and 
to the currencies  of  the  Member  States. 
Thus  there are  grounds  for  asserting that the entry of the  drachma  into 
the  EMS  will  mean  tighter monetary  control for  Greece,  reduction  in the  rate 
of inflation  and  the  option  of  monetary  and  economic  stabili·ty.  The  benefi'cs 
of monetary  stability are  well-known  and  beyond  dispute:  facilitation of trade 
and  international  exchanges  in  particular,  better forecasting  and easier 
programming,  less  insecurity  and  less business  risk. 
For  a  small  economy,  such  as  the  Greek  economy,  entry into  a  monetary 
union  or  zone,  such  as  the  EMS,  has  the  following  advantages; 
1.  The  production  and  exports of  a  small  economy  are  less cifferenciated 
than  those  of  a  large economy.  External  shocks,  such  as  a  change  in 
international  demand  or  in price levels,  have  a  greater effect on  ·:  .~ 
a  small  undifferentiated economy .than on  a  1·arge  economy.  By  en·cer1ng  a 
monetary  zone  the  intensity of these effects is reduced because  with1n 
this monetary  zone  there  is  a  poo~ing of reserves,  in other  \JOrc:ls  some 
of  the  effects are  borne  by  the other  i·lember  Scates. 
2.  For  the  same  reason changes  in international prices or  ~r1ce ~alances 
have  e  greater  e~fect on  domestic prices resulting in greater p.cice 
fluctl'.:~tions.  Entry  into  a  monetary  zone  moderates  these  fluctuacion3. 
3.  Small  economics  w1tli  il  small  monetary  area  arc  f:a:c  more  vuln-2ra::)1e  ::o 
specula  t1on  i:lqcuns t  their currency.  :.-:m:.cy  1.n co  che  ::i:JoiJS  W.l th  '.:he 
currency  sup~ort mechanisms  wh1ch  have  been  prov1ded for  safeguard 
the  drachma  from  speculation of this kind1 . 
There  are  also  arguments  against entry connecte? with  the  cost wh1ch 
this decision  1nvolves.  However,  this cost,  which  is the  cost of adjustment, 
is medium-term  whereas  the benef1ts  are  long-term. 
-----·--------
1 
Sec  ilcr:b0rt  Christ1e,  JVlicllclc  l"ra  .... 1anni  ';<:urOfK'an  monetary  union: 
rehabilitacion  o(  a  cabc  an~ some  choughts  for  strategy'  in  'One 
money  for  Europe',  Macm1llan,  London  1978,  p.8. 
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1.  There  1s  support  for  the  v1ew  that  a  negat1ve  relationsh1p exists 
between  the  rate of  inflat1on  and  the  level  of  unemployment.  The 
entry of  the  dr~chma 1nto the  EMS  means  a  reduced rate  of  1nflation 
1n  Greece,  in  other  words  reduced  employment  (increased  unemployment). 
In  accordance  w1th  th1s  theory 1t 1s  logical that the  aim  of providing 
employment  should be  tackled by  an  extensive monetary policy 1nvolving 
1ncreased 1nflat1on  in  the  long  run.  However,  the existence  of  th1s 
positive relationship  between  employment  find  the  rate of  inflat1on 
(which  is  known  as  the Phillips  function)  has  been called into question, 
particualrly  1n  the  l1ght  of modern  empir1cal  studies  wh1ch  draw  the 
conclusion  that,  in  the  long  term,  the  level of  unemployment  is 
1ndependent  of  the  rate of  1nflation.  The  Ph1llips  function  holds  true 
l 
only  when  there  is money  1llusion  1n  the  workforce  but  th1s  1s  no 
longer  the  case.  Thus,  in  the  long-term,  as  increased rate of 
1nflat1on  does  not  mean  reduced  unemployment  and  th1s  argument  aga1nst 
l 
the entry  of  the  drachma  1nto the  EMS  is  shown  to  be  fallac1ous  . 
Stagflat1on(simultaneous  inflation, and  unemployment)  provides  further 
ample  proof  of  the  inval1d1ty of  the  Ph1llips  funct1on. 
2.  It has  been  posited that governments  gain  from  1nflation because  they 
collect  an  'inflation tax'  owing  to  1ncreased direct  and  (~o  a  lesser 
degree)  tnd1rect  taxes  insofar  as  the  tax  rates  are  not  adJUSted  to  the 
cost of  living.  Nominal  1ncomes,  as  opposed  to real  incomes,  increase 
and  are  placed  1n  a  higher  tax brackets  w1th  higher  ~ax rates.  In 
th1s  way,  thanks  purely to lnflation,  state revenues  are  automatically 
increased without  any  new  tax  being  im~osed.  Inflation benef1ts 
~orrowers and  the  State  lS  a  net  borrower.  Finally,  part1al monetary 
1nstab1l1ty affords  the State greater  short-term manoeuvrabllity  to 
satlsfy various  demands,  such  as  wage  1ncreases,  etc. 
The  view  that the  State benefits  from  inflat1on  does  not  seem  to  be 
correct  accord1ng  to  recent  emp1r1cal  stud1es  1n  the  USA  and  West 
Germany.  There  stud1es  show  inflation to  have  the effect of 1ncreasing 
th~  Stat~'s overall  expendcture  more  rapidly than  1ts overall  1ncome 
In  tl1e  short-term an  unexpected  accelerat1on  ln  the  rate of  inflat1on  can 
temporar1ly  reduce  unemployment.  However,  the  social cost  of  an  unexpected 
acceleration  in  the  rate of 1nflation is great  because  econom1c  un1ts 
ad]ust  to  fluctuat~ons 1n  the  rate of  inflat1on  by  using  resources,  which 
means  that these  resources  are  not  available  for  other  uses.  Adjustment 
to  fluctuatlons  in  the  rate of  1nflat1on  lS  tantamount  to  a  waste  of 
resources.  See  II.  Chr1st1e, .M.  Fratiannl,  op.cit.  p.  23-24. 
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accordingly
1
.  Consequently,  this  argument  against entry of  the  drachma 
into the  EMS  is  also,  to say  the least,  doubtful.  Even  1f it were  correct, 
it is based  on  the,contention that the state monopoly  over the control 
of  the  money  supply.is corrupt.  This  is not  acceptable  ~n a  democratic 
state and  a  greater degree  of  transparency concerning state revenue  lS 
desirable.  If,  in fact,  deceleration  in the rate of  rnflat1on  reduces 
state revenue  (without  further  reducing state expenditure,  wh1ch  is  the 
conclusion  that modern  empirical  studies  reach)  and  increases  the  st·ate 
.  ' 
defic1t,  then the  hidden .inflat1on tax  shou'ld be  reJ.:)laced  by  a  cor::-espondin'g 
increase  in  taxat1on  apparent to all taxpayers. 
3.  Entry  of  -che  drachma  in-co  the  ~!1S  means  a  partial loss  of  monetary 
1ndependence  and  of  the possibil1ty of  drawing  up  of  autonomous  monetary 
policy because entry  1nto the  EMS  imposes  de  facto  restrict1ons  on 
ex~ans1ve monetary  pol1cies  which  differ to any  greac  degree  from  the 
monetary policy ?f.the stronger currencies of  the  3MS.  Ocherwisc,  the 
drachma  will  not  be  able  to  remain  within  the  limi~s of  fluctuat1on 
1mposed  by  the  EMS. 
However,  th1s  argu!Uent  do.es  noo:  appear to stand up  because,  in· the  t"iresent 
cond1 tions  and  the present  1.nternat1onal  eco'nomic  system,  a  small  coun'cry, 
~Drticuldrly  ~  small  country  like Greece  which,  to  a  large  extent,  is 
detJcndcnc  upon  import:!:>  or  c~pital goods  and  fuel,  does  not  have  'che  Ot:)L:)orcunity 
to  pursue  a  truly  1n<lcpcndenL  and  autonomous  monetary  policy.  External 
pressures  are  very  strong  and  independence  is merely  apparent. 
For  Greece  an  autonomous  maet:ary  policy means  choosing,  as  'che  result of 
an  expansive monetary policy,  a  policy of  devaluing  the  drachwa.  ?he  basic 
argument  of  this policy  (in  add1tion  to its pract1cal  simpl1c1·ty  and  the 
arguments  for  strengthen1ng  employment  and  tHe  'infla~ion  ta;~'  ~eferred to 
~bove)  lS  that  'a cheap  drachma  means  stronger exports'. 
However,  even  th1s  op1nion,  which  was  once  accepted  as  correc~,  is  now 
seriously  disputed.  Today  countries  w1th  strong currencies  such  as  Germany, 
Holldnd  and  Sweden'o1:cupy  il  stronger pos1tion  1n  the matcer  of  in~ernational 
e;cports.  For  countr1cs  l1ke  Greece,  which  depends  directly on  imports  of 
cap1tal goods  and  fuel,  the  policy of  devaluing  the  drachma  is wrong  because 
it increases disproportionately the  cost  and expenditure  for  these  imports. 
1 
See  David Laidler  'Difficult1es  w1th  European  monetary  union'  1n  'One  money 
for  Europe'  op.  cit.  p.  59  and  Peter Kahnert,  N1kos  Kyriazis  'Inflat1on 
and state expend1ture',  Oikonomikos  Tachydromos,  31  Augus~ 1978,  where 
the  results of empirical  research on  this matter  in  Western  Germany  are 
presented;  and  Roland  Vaubel  'Minimizing  imbalances  in monetary  union'  1n 
'One  money  for  Europe'  op.  cit.  p.  110. 
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result ·that the  country's external balance  of payments  1s made  worse  since 
exports  do  not  increase  correspondingly  seeing  that  the  cost of production 
is increased because of  the greater cost of  the'imported production  factors. 
Increased petrol pr1ces  In  domestic  currency  strengthens  inflation.  Inflation 
is,  in part,  imported  and  the effect of  the  1mported part of inflation increases 
according  as  the drachma  weakens  against  the  currencies  of  the countries  from 
wh1ch  it impor_ts  (in  the  case of petrol,  the  Americal  dollar).  Increased rates 
of  inflation and  an  increased balance of payments  deficit lead to  a  new 
devaluation  of  the  drachma  and  ~he cycle starts over  again. 
?or this reason,  the  policy of  devaluing the  drachma  is incorrect; 
entry 1nto the  EMS  and  the  corresponding stability which it promises  is 
a  ~c~ter solution. 
The  conclusion of  the  above  argument  IS· that,  after  a  preliminary 
cxamjn~t1on of  the  subject,  it is better for  the  drachma  and  tbe  Greek 
economy  if the  drachma  enters  the  EMS  rather  than  remaining outside. 
Moreover,  there  is  the  possibili~y of  choosing  a  greater margin  of 
1 
fluctuation  for  a  limited period,  such  as  the  Italian lira's 6%. 
1see  N.  Kyr1az1s  "Drachma  and  EMS"  in  Review  of  the  European  Communi-
tics,  vol.2,  number  4,  Oct.-~ec.  1981. 
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F.l.-rw.jll/ah  - 45  -1.  The  theory  of  economic  lntegration 
The  intenslfication of  competition ·following  the  abolition of  import 
dutles  resulting  from  accesslon to an  economic  union  where  there is free 
movement  of  goods,  as  ln  the  Community,  has  consequences  for  the  size of 
undertakings  in  every  sector  of  <:~ny  country  joinlng that uion.  And  the 
ch~nge ln  the  size  of  its undertakings  influences  the  country's production 
potential.  In  most  industri<:~l  sectors  in Greece  there  are  economleS  of 
sculc1 .  By  taklng  ddvantage  of  these  and  improving  the  size of  productive 
unlts  in  consequence  of  increased competition,  competitiveness is  improved 
2  as  unlt costsof productlon  are  reduced. 
When  a  country  is  integrated lnto an  economic  union  the  size of  its 
undertaklngs  dre  affected in  three  ways. 
1.  By  expansion of  the  market 
2.  By  increased competitlon 
3.  By  differentiatlon of  lncomes  and  therefore  of  demand. 
Point  N°  1  1.s  of  no  great  importance  for  Greece  because,  thanks  to the 
Association Agreement,  accession  does  not essentially change  the  situation 
whlch  previously existed.  The  provislons  of  the Association Agreement  were 
such  that most  Greek  lndustrlal products  (with  a  few  exceptions,  i.e.  in 
the  textile sector)  could  be  exported to the  markets  of  ~1ember States 
duty  free  and  without  quantitative restrictions. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Greek  market  was  protected  (and still is protected 
for  the  so-called  'sensltlve'  industrlal products until expiry of  a  five-
year  transitional period)  by  (high or  relatively high)  import  duties.  That 
situation has  been  changed  by  accession  (and  by  the gradual  reduction  of 
dutles  durlng  assoclatlon)  placlng Greek  lndustry  in competition with  that 
of  the Community.  Thls  competltion  is puttlng pressure  on  Greek units 
to  increase their slze,  take  advantage  of  the  economies  of  scale and  introduce 
new  organizution  and  technology,  thus  benefiting the  cost,  efficiency  and 
compet1.t1veness  of  Greek  undertakings3 
It is difflcult lo estimate  the effect of  changes  in  income  reshlting 
from  accesslon.  Such  changes  could  lead to  a  reduction  in  revenue  from profits, 
as  competitlon could squeeze  profit margins  that were  high  in Greek  lndustry 
because  of tariff protectlon. 
_l ______  ·----
See  Table  111.2  of  the  statistical annex 
2  Sec  Annex  I 
3  See  Annex  I 
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markets  where  there  1s  market  segmentation,  small units  receive  a  degree  of 
protection and  are  more  likely to survive  despite their  small  s1ze. 
Market  segmentation  can  be  due  to  the  following  factors: 
1.  Labour  market  segmentation  involving  the exploitation of  groups  who 
receive  lower  wages  than  those current on  the rest of  the  market.  Such 
groups  are unskilled workers,  young  people,  foreign  workers,  wo~en, etc. 
2.  Regional  segmentation  in areas where  the  intensity of  foreign  competition 
1s  relatively reduced  owing  to the  undeveloped 1nfrastructure  (communica-
tions,  etc.) 
3.  Segmentation  due  to specialization.  Because  of  inten~e specialization 
these  producers  gain  a  kind of  monopolistic position  in what  is usually 
a  l1mited sector  of  the  market
1
. 
2.  The  structure of  Greek  1ndustry 
The  structure of Greek 1ndustry is characterized by modP.rn.  relatively large.  lnterna-
tionally competitive units co-existing with many  small units of low efficienr.y whose  equip-
ment is usually old.  Th1s  sittmtion indicates that there 1s market  segmentat1on in Greek 
industry. 
Small  and medium-sized  industrial enterprises play  an  important  role 
in the  Community,  both  from  the point of  view of  employment  and production. 
In the  Community,  undertakings  with  up  to 500  employees  are placed in this 
category,  whereas  in Greece,  in accordance  with  the  Greek  statistical 
service's classification,  undertak1ngs  w1th  100  or  more  employees  are  clas-
sed  as  large  industries.  Of  the  200  largest  industries  1n  Greece  the  last 
120  each  had  less  than  499  employees  in December  1977;  they  were  classed in 
2  the  200-499  employee  category 
The  percentage of total employment  accounted for  by  undertakings  with 
less than  500  employees  was:  Greece  88.4%  (1973),  Italy  67%  (1971),  Nether-
lands  61~  (1973),  Belgium  57%  (1970),  West  Germany  0.52%  (1967),  France 
49%  (1971)  and  England  32%  (1972). 
l  According  to the  theory  of  economic  integration;  see Cavanagh,  Catha! 
·~ate on  the estimation of  the effects of  economic  integration'  unpublished 
study  by  the Commission  of  the  EC,  Brussels,  March  1977;  F.dwards,  Geoffrey; 
·wallace,  William;  Tsoukalis,  Loukas  'A  wider  European  Community',  Federal 
Trust  Paper,  1977;  llummen,  Wilhelm  'Greek  industry  in the  EC:  Prospects 
and  problems',  German  Development  Institute,  Berlin  1977-;  Meade,  James 
'The  theory of  customs  unions'  North  Holland Publishing Company,  Amsterdam 
1955;  Scitovsky,  Tibor  'Economic  theory  and Western  European  integration' 
Amsterdam  1958;  Takayama,  Akira  'International trade'  Hold,  Rinehard  and 
Winston  Inc.  1972 
2  See  ''I'he  200  largest Greek  industr1al enterprises'  in  Industrial Review, 
December  1977,  pp.  35-38 
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still contlnUJng,  these  percentages will  have  changed,  mean1ng  that the 
.  . 
percentage  of  persons  employed  in  undertakings  of  less  than  500  employees 
w1ll  have  Fallen.  However,  the  ratio between  Member  States  should not  have 
.  . f.  1  1  changed  s1gn1  1cant y. 
Increased compet1tion  following  accession will result  in  the closure 
of  a  number  of  small  Greek  undertak1ngs  unable  to  respond.  To  the  extent that 
the  resources  thus  released  (labour  and  ~apita~)  can  be  absorbed  by  other 
more  compet1t1ve  undertakings,  Greece  w1ll benefit by  having  its industrial 
structure  streaml1ned  and  its overall competitiveness  increased.  In  the 
readJustment  phase  there could be  some  probl~ms,  such  as  increased unemploy-
ment,  but  these  problems  (the  economic  cost  of  readjustment)  are  medium-term 
wh1le  the  benefits  are  long-term.  Measures  aimed  at preserving  the  structure 
of  Greek  1ndustry  as  it lS  at present  (measures  in  favour  of  small  and  medlum-
Slzed undertakings)  are  unsound,  unless  they  are  s1mply  measures  which  facilitate 
readJustment.  The  benef1c1al  results which  it was  believed could  be  achieved 
by  accession will  be  ach1evcd  only  1f competitive  forces  are set free  to 
change  the  structure of  Greek  industry,  mak1ng  it more  competitive  and efficient 
1n  the  lonq  run.  It would  be  a  contradict1on  on  the  one  hand  to  support 
access1on  and  to  pra1se  its posltJve  results  while  asking,  on  the  other  hand, 
for  protective measures  to preserve  the  present  structure  (by  curbing  the  free 
plQy  of  market  forces}. 
Several  forecasts  about  Greek  industry  following  accession  can  be  made  in 
the  l1ght  of  the  exper1ence  of  Ireland,  where  the  industrial structure is not 
so  different  from  that of Greece  and where  industry  rece1ved  high tariff pro-
tection until  1973.  In  Ireland there were  no  signs  of  a  large  increase  in the 
number  of  undertak1ngs  forced  to close  because  of  increased competition  follow-
ing  accessjon.  Consequently,  there  was  no  problem  of  increased  unemployment 
because  of  access1on. 2 
The  percentage  of  Greek  undertakings  with  less  than  10  employees  was 
51.8%  in  1958  and  this  fell to  39.8~  1n  1973.  The  percentage  of med1um-sized 
undertak1ngs  (mcdium-slzed  1n  Greek  terms}  w1th  between  10-50  employees 
rema1ned  about  the  same  1n  th1s  period;  the  percentage  of  large undertakings 
w1th  50  or  more  employees  rose  from  27.9%  in  1958  to  39%  in  1973.  From  1958 
to  1973  200,000  new  jobs  were  created  in  Greek  industry,  120,000  of  which 
(GO%  of  the  new  jobs}  were  absorbed  by  large units w1th  50  or  more  employees. 
Between  1963  and  1976  produc~1vity rose  at  a  ~ate of  9%  per year  compared to 
5.4%  per  year  between  1952  and  1962.  This  rate was.the  highest  of  all the 
OECD  countries with  the  exception  of  Japan  where  the  rate  was  11%. 3 
1  See  Table  TI.4  of  the  stat1stical annex 
2  See  Dermot  Me  Aleese  'Outward-looking  policies,  manufactured exports  and 
economic  growth:  The  Ir1sh experience'  AUTE  Conference,  Swansea,  March  1977 
3  See  G1orgos  Kalamotousak1s  'Greece's  accesion  1n  the  EC'  - 'Mediterranean 
countr1es  and  the  EC'  Conference,  Lesbos,  September  1977,  page  7 
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followed  the  signing  of  the Association Agreement  with  the Community.  In 
1965  the  level  of  investment,  at  1960  prices,  was  144%  higher  than  the-level 
in  1960.  Between  1965  and  1975  investment  increased-stillfurther by  74%. 
40%  of  private  investment  (or  one-third of  the total of  private anq,state 
investment)  was  d1rected  into the  hou~e-building sector.  Sometimes  this 
investment  is  seen  as  non-productive  b~ause it does  not increase productive 
potential.  Howc·r:!r,  this is an  important  sector because it increases  demand 
for  products  in  ~lmost all the other industrial  sectors.  This  sector is also 
extremely  important  for  increas1ng  the mobility of  labour1 . 
The  weaknesses  of Greek  industry are  as  follows: 
1.  There  are  many  inefficient industrial units,  some  of which  will  not 
surv1ve  the  increased competition  from  the  Community. 
2.  'I'here  are  many  labour-intensive units which,  in the  Community,  are 
capital-lntensive.  Because  of  the  low capital-lntensity in Greece  and 
the  small  size of  undertakings  their cost  structure  is' uncompetitive. 
3.  'I'he  degree  of  spec1al1zation  and vertical production are,  with  few  excep-
tlons,  min1mal. 
4.  Greek  1ndustry is concentrated in  a  few  areas  (Athens- Piraeus,  Attica-
Corinth,  Boeotia,  Chalkis,  Thessaloniki  ,  and,  to  a  lesser degree,  Patras, 
Voles,  Larissa·and Herakl1on).2  The  remaining  regions  of  Greece  are 
industr1ally underdeveloped.  There  are  significant differences  in the 
standard of  living between  the  developed  and  underdeveloped regions. 
Furthermore,  the excessive concentration of  industry  in  small  regions  like 
Attica  and  'I'hessaloniki  has  created serious  problems  of  atmospher1c 
poJlution  and  env1ronmcntal  damage. 
An  economic  policy  to strengthen the restructuring influence of  1ncreased 
compet1tion  following  accession  would  have  to  include  the  following  points: 
1.  A  policy  for  merging  small  undertakings  in order  to increase their  s1ze  and 
make  it possible to take  advantage  of  economies  of  scale.  Since  most  Greek 
undertak1nqs  have  a  turn-over well  below  15  million dollars  {the  level 
f1xed  by  the  CommissJon  so  as  not  to interfere with  competition),  the  motives 
for  bringing  ahout  merqers  in Greek  industry are  not  in conflict with  the 
Community's  rules  on  compet1t1on. 
2.  A  regionaJ  pol1cy  for  the  development  of  the  less-developed regions. 
3.  Reorientation of  small  undertaki.,~gs to gain  a  greater degree  of  specialization 
in  producing  a  smaller  numb~r of \~roducts.  Specialization has  th~ same 
effect as  market  segmentation,  i~',~other words  it is  a  means  of  protection 
aga1nst  increased competition. 
1  See  Dermot  Me  Aleese  'Outward-looking policies,  manufactured exports  and 
economj c  growth:  'I'hc  Trish  e:x:periencc',  AUTF.  Conference,  Swanse.a,  March  1977 
2  Sec  'l'ahlc  Tl  - 5  of  the  statist1caJ  annex 
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selling and  procurement  activities in given  sectors.  Undertakings 
which  particlpate  in  these organizatlons  can  retain their  independence. 
The  organization  representlng  them wlll be  better placed to collect 
statistics and  information on  market  trends,  new  technolog~es etc. 
can  also represent  small  undertakings  in  the  raw  materials market  (a 
very  substantial market)  and  promote  exports,  obtalning better terms, 
.  1  reduclng  costs,  etc. 
It 
5.  Ju  the. field of  technology  Greece  is  dependent  on  foreign  countries  and 
thls  dependency will  continue.  However,  attempts  should  be  made  to step 
up  technological  research  within  Greece  and  to  concentrate lt in  a  few 
sectors  (research  speciallzatLon). 
1 
2 
Greece  has  important  scientlflc potential.  Many  Greek scientists have 
studied and  worked  abroad  and  are therefore  acquainted with  recent 
technologlcal  developments.  Furthermore,  there  have  been  satisfactory 
research  results  in certaln sectors  in Greece,  such  as  Larke's use  of 
thelr  own  technologlcal  method  to refine  nickel.  At  the  moment  Greece 
spends  only  Q2%  of  its GNP  on  research,  a  very  low  percentage  compared 
to other  Member  States. 2 
Sec  llem.  Clla 1 i k ius 'f·:conomic  devc lopmen t  j  n  Greece  and  the balance  of 
payments',  Bank  of  Greece,  Athens  1963,  page  10 
Sec  G.B.  Patlkis'Development  problems  of  Greek  industry'  Bank  of Greece, 
Athens '1976,  page  26 
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In  the  follow1ng  section  the  standard s1ze  of  undertaking  ln Greek 
industrial  sectors  lS  compared  with  th~ standard  s1ze  of  undertak1ng  in 
the  corresponding  sectors of  certain other countries.1 
1.  Food  industry:  Th~ sector's  star~~rd size of  undertak1ng2is between 
1-4  employees,  which  accounts  for  ~8% of  the  total  number  of  employees. 
The  standard size is the  same  1n  ~caly,  France  and  Germany  (27%,  33% 
and  22%  respectively)  while  in Holland the  number  of  employees  lS  50-99 
(22%),  and  in  Belgium,  the  USA  an~ Japan  the  number  of  employees  lS· 
100-499,  corresponding  to  31%,  4lu  and  22%  of the total  number  of 
employees  respectively.  In  Greec~ the  sector presents  significant 
economies  of  scale  up  to  1.39  in  certain fields.  By  increasing the  size 
of undertak1ngs,  the  competitiveness  of this sector  - which generally 
seems  to  be  relatively dynamic,  especially as  regards  products  which  use 
Greek  raw  mater1als  (frult,  etc.)  -could be  sign1f1cantly 1ncreased. 
2.  P.l::!-_!:1.!<.~-~ndustry:  Here  again  economies  of  scale  are  1mportant  ( l.  30),  in 
other  words  an  increase  1n  the  average  size of  undertakings  could sig-
nJficantly  reduce  the  un1t  cost.  There  are  good  prospects,  too,  for  units 
wh1ch  use  domestic  raw materials  and  produce  an  1nternat1onally known 
product  (1.e.  ouzo)  or  brand  (i.e.  Metaxa).  Standard s1ze  100-499  (25.5%). 
Standard size:  100-499  (29.4%).  This  sector will 
only  be  affected by  accession if there  is  a  change  in  demand  towards 
western-style  tobacco  and cigarettes. 
4.  ~_e_x_~_i_l_e_s:  One  of  Greek  industry's most  1mportant  sectors,  which  continued 
to expand  wh•ile  contracting  in  the  Member  States.  Standard size:  100-499 
f 
1n  France  (42%),  Italy  (33%),  Belgium  (44%),  Germany  (41%),  Greece  (34%), 
USA  (42%),  ?apan  (22%).  Only  in Holland  lS  the  standard size  1,000 or 
more.  The  ~extiles sector accounts  for  approx1mately  25%  of Greece's 
total  industr1al  exports.  Here  again  there  are  econom1es  of  scale  (1.17). 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  stdndard size of  undertak1ng  1s  the  same  in 
Greece  as  ~t 1s  ln  most  industrJal countries,  there  are still qu1te 
substantial d1fferences  at  the  top  end:  the  largest undertak1ng  in  the 
sector  in, Greece  (PIRA!KI-PA'I'RAIKI)  had  a  turn-over of  60  m1ll1on  dollars 
1n  1973  compared'to  963  m1llion  dollars  for  Coats  Patons  (England), 
· Tootal. \'kngland)  499  mill1on  dollars,  Groupe  Agache  Willot  (France) 
490  m1Li1on  dollars,  Sollfuss  M1eg  (France)  355  million dollars, 
Lain1ere  de  Roubaix  (France)  294  mill1on dollars,  and  Delden  {Germany) 
299  mill1on dollars.  However,  in the medium  term  the  sector's competitive-
ness  in  the  Commun1ty  will  remain  high. 
I  ----
The  compar1son  is based  on  Tables  II.l,  II.2  and  III.2 of  the  stat1st1cal 
·annex 
2  /\  :,cctur':-:  st..:t11dard  '->J7.c  of  tm<k'rtiJktng  refcn:  to  t.hc  avcrage·s1.zc  of 
undertuk1ng  HI  which  tllc  m<~]OrJty or  the  sector's employees arc  employed 
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market  segmentat1on  1n  th1s  sector is 1mportant  for  the  surv1val  of  small 
undertak1ngs.  Standard  s1ze:  1-4  France  (29%),  Italy  (49%)  and  Greece 
(45%),  100-499  1n  the  rema1ning  countries with  the except1on of  Japan 
(20-49)  and  Holland  (50-99).  Econom1es  of  scale are  not part1culariy 
1mportant. 
6.  Wood-Cork:  Although  econom1es  of  scale are  fa1rly  s1gnif1cant  (1.22), 
this  sector is not part1cularly 1mportant  for  Greece.  Standard  s1ze  is 
also  1-4. 
7.  Furn1ture:  In  th1s  sector,  as  1n  the  preceding  sector,  Greece  has  no 
compet1tive  advantage. 
( l.  09). 
EconomJes  of  scale  are  not part1cularly sign1ficant 
8.  ?~Eer  1n~ytry:  In this sector Greece  is dependent  upon  1mports  of  raw 
mater1als.  The  standard s1ze  of  undertaking  in  Greece  and  the  other 
countr1es  1s  100-499,  though  the  percentage  of  undertakings  of this size 
in  Greece  (25%)  1s  smaller  than  1n  the  other  Member  States.  Econom1es  of 
.scale  arc  relatively  smalJ  (1.09). 
9.  T_E1n~1ng~Publ1sh1ng:  The  Greek  language  allows  undertak1ngs  1n  th1s 
sector an  almost  monopolist1c  pos1t1on  on  the  Greek  market,  protect1ng it 
from  cornpetit1on.  The  standard  s1ze  in th1s  sector  1n  Greece  1s  100-499 
with  25.1%  of  the  total number  of  employees. 
10.  Pelts  and  furs:  The  pelt-process1ng sector,  wh1ch  operates  together w1th 
the  footwear sector, 1s  relatively dynamic.  The  fur  sector,  on  the other 
hand,  1s  not  part1cularly 1mportant.  Econom1es  of scale are  small  (1.07). 
11.  Plast1cs-Rubber:  In  th1s  sector  the  standard  size  for  all 1ndustrialized 
countr1es  J.s  above  1,000  people,  1n  other  words  there  1s  a  prevalence of 
large  1ndustrial units.  However,  1n  Greece  the  standard  s1ze  is  100-499, 
w1th  33%  of  the  total  number  of  employees.  Econom1es  of  scale  are 
relat1vely  s1gn1f1cant  (1.18)  which  means  that an  1ncrease  1n  the  s1ze  of 
Greek ul!dertak1ngs w1ll  j ncrease  the1r compet1tiveness. 
12.  Chem~~~~:nd~st~y:  In  th1s  sector there  1s,  1nternat1onally,  a  large 
degree  of  spec1al1zat1on.  Increased competit1on  follow1ng  accession w1ll 
strengthen the  trend towards  spec1alization wh1ch  1s  already be1ng  noted 
1n  the  Greek  chem1cal  1ndustry.  The  standard  s1ze  of  undertak1ng  is 
100-499  for  France,  Italy,  Belg1um  and  Greece  and  1,000  or more  for 
Holland,  the  USA  and  Japan.  The  largest undertak1ngs  1n  all those  countries 
are  many  t1mes  larger  than  the  largest Greek  undertakings.  Economies  of 
scale  are  amongst  the  h1ghest  1n  Greek  1ndustry  (1.24),  in other words  there 
are  s1gn1ficant margins  for  reducing  costs  and  increas1ng the  average  s1ze 
of  Greek  undertak1ngs. 
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products.  Exports  in this sector  are  1mportant,  com1ng  directly behind 
exports  1n  the textile and  clothing sector.  Th1s  sec-tor  1s  cap1 tal-
intensive. 
14.  Non-metallic  minerals:  This  sector comprises  products manufactured  from 
raw materials of non-metallic minerals  such  as  marble,  fire~resistant 
materials,  cement,  glass,  ceram1c  goods  and  sanitary ware.  Overall, 
this  lS  one  of  the  most  compet1tive  sectors of  Greek  1ndustry,  w1th 
high exports.  The  standard  size of undertaking is loo-499  WJ.th m  exceptwn 
of the Netherlands,  where  it is  smaller  ( 50-99).  Here  also there 
arc  r€' lat 1 vely  s.Lgnl f icant economies  of  scale  ( 1. 16) ,  wh1 ch  m<'an::. 
that  1ncreas1ng  the  average  size of  Greek  undertakings  would  have 
bcnef1cial  results  for  the  competitiveness of this sector. 
15.  Metal  process1ng:  This  sector processes  the metals  produced  from 
Greek  ores  such as  aluminium,  copper,  nickel,  etc.  In all countries, 
including Greece,  undertakings  are  large,  w1th  1,000  or  more  employees. 
Nevertheless  econom1es  of  scale are  here  too  in the order of 1.18. 
16.  F1n1shed metall1c  products_:  In  th1s  sector the  standard  s1ze  varies 
from  1-4  in  Greece  (41%)  to 100-499  in France,  Italy,  Belg1um,  Germany 
and  the  USA.  The  un1ts  in  this sector  ln  Greece  are  exceptionally 
~>illdll  compdl<'d  lo thnsl'  111  oUH'r  Jrtdustrl.lljzed  ccJuntrt<..'~;.  Ncvc.•rLhc•lc·:-.:., 
0ven  here  there  are  relat1vely significant econom1es  of  scale  (l.JB). 
17.  !':l_<?_c_~!.l_~l-~!Y:  llcrc  ilCJuin  in  Greece  the  standard-size is very  small  (l-4) 
compared  to that of other 1ndustr1al1zed countr1es.  On  the  other 
hand,  economies  of  scale  are  s1gnif1cant  (1.22). 
18.  Electr1cal  machines:  Standard size  in  Greece  is 100-499,  for  other 
1ndustrial1zed countr1es  1,000  and  above.  Economies  of  scale  are 
relatively s1gn1ficant  (1.22). 
19.  ~ransport:  Essent1ally there  are  no  product1ve  units  in Greece  with 
thE.•  excepl101i  of  the  shipyards,  which  are  relatively competitiVE'  ;mel 
arc  cop1ng  sal.u:;factor1ly at  the  moment  with  the crisis in  the  sector. 
The  other  undertakings  are mainly  repair or,  for  the  most  part, 
assembly  enterprises.  ·Thus,  while  the  standard size for  other 
industr.Lal1zed countries  lS  1,000  or more,  in  Greece  it 1s  1-4. 
8connm1es  of  scale  are  s1gn1ficant  (1.21). 
20.  Rema1n1ng  1ndustries:  Th1s  sector is not  very  important  in  Greece, 
but 1t does  include  some  competit1ve  sectors  such  as  jewellery making. 
A  study based  in the  comparison of  numbers  of  employees  1s,  of course, 
rather one-sided because  1t falls to take  into account  differences  in 
the  level  of  cap1tal.  Thus,  for  example,  an  undertak1ng  1n  Germany  in 
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could  have  much  more  capital and  belong  to  a  different category on  the 
bas1s  of  1ts  level of  cap1tal.  Unfortunately,  however,  there  are  no 
figures  for  mak1ng  compar1sons  on  the  basis  of capital.  On  the other 
hand,  cconom1es  of  scale  (whjch  are valid for  a  simultaneous  increase 
1n  cap1tal  and  labour)  prov1de  an  accurate  yardstick  for  the  increase 
in  a  sector's competitiveness  (red~ction of costs)  when  the  size of the 
sector's undertakings  is  increased. 
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Econom1es  of  scale,  unit cost  and  s1ze of  undertaking. 
That  the  unit cost  is  reduced when  advantage  is taken  of  economies  of 
scale can  be  demonstrated  as  follows: 
Productlon  function  is neo-classical,  in other words  labour  can  be 
substituted by  cap1tal  and  vice· versa. 
1.  y  f  (L,K)  where  Y  production 
K  cap1tal 
L  labour 
For  the  sake  of  simpllctty  we  shall take  the  spec1al  case  of  the  COBB-DOUGLAS 
Junct1on,  where 
2.  Y  =La  Kb  where  a= elastic1ty of  production of  labour 
b  elasticity of  production of cap1tal 
and  a  +  b  s  homogeneity  degree  or  scale elasticity 
Cost  funct1on  is: 
3.  c  w.L.  +  r.K.  where  C  cost 
w  wage 
r  =  rate of  inter~st 
The  unit cost of  production  is: 
4.  c 
y 
w.L.  +  r.K. 
La  .  Kb 
Economies  of  scale  mean:  s  a  +  b) 1 
In  other words,  when  the  level of product1on  is  increased by a  coefficient~ 
(where  A  1s greater  than  1),  output  increases  more  than proportionally. 
c  =-). .w~:  ~ 
y  (,XL) a 
)..r.K 
(>.K )b 
Since a+ b)  J,  we  have 
).  (w.L~  + r.k) 
-~a+b LaKb 
____  ),_____  <  1,  or  the express1on  >.a 1-b 
wL  +  rK 
La rr-
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wL- +'"rK ',· 
La~<b 
/I~' .I. The  left part of the expression  1s  the  un1t  cost after taking 
advantag~ of  cconom1es .of  scale  and  1s  less  than  the  right part,  whir:h  1s 
the  unit cost  before  t-ak1ng  advantage  of  economies  of  scale. 1 
The  cxJstence  of  import  dut1es protects  the  domestic  maiket  and 
rPduces  competition,  and  th1s  has  a  negative effect  on  t-he  !';i.ze  of  a 
r-.ector 's  ucrdertc~ldngs,  as  the  following  graph  clearly  srJOws: 
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LAC  d1min1shing cost  function 
OP  pr tce  level 1n the  econom1c  union 
oz  lli l<'r)  level  on  the  domestic  market,  before  access ton,  whcu• 
PZ  1~  the  1mport  duty 
OT  prtce  on  the  dornest1c  market  after access1on,  without  duty, 
where  P'r  1s  the  transport cost 
Consequently,  when  OZ  is  the market  pr1ce,  un1ts  whose  unit cost is 
lower  than  OZ  can  survive.  The  size of  undertakings  1s  shown  by  the 
product  XZ.  After the  abol1tion of  import  duties,  the market  pr1ce  1s  OP 
(or  OT  if  there  dre  transport  costs)  and  undertakings  with costs greater 
than  OT  are  forced  to close. 
'I'll('  '·' /.f'  "'  lilld<'rtdi< 11\lj  I fiC'rQd!:.C'h  drld  IJecomcs  XJ>  (OJ'  x,,.  l  r  til<' II'  .1(1' 
tt~ll:•iJ<>II  'o:.t :,) .  Tho~  t·r,ln·-;1><>11:  C()St.•;,  like  1mport  dut.H•s,  ,,r.."  1<•1111  (>( 
protectLotl  for  domestic:  productlon.  Market  segmentation  has  exactly  the 
same  results. 2 
_1 ___  _ 
See  N1kos  Kyr1az1s  'Griechenlands Beitritt zur  EG
1
,  supra.  p.  120 
2  See  German  Development  Institute:  'Greece's entry  into the  Common 
Market:  Effects  on  the  development of the  Greek  small  and  med1um  scale 
1ndustry',  Berlin  1977,  pp.  36-38 
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- 58  -The  sectors  of  Greek  Lndustry  and  the1r  code  number 
20  Food 
21  Beverage 
2 2  Tob.-1cco 
7  l  'I'PXl  I  lc~; 
24  Foolwcar  and  Clothing 
25  Wood  and  Cork 
26  Furn1turc 
27  Paper 
28  Pr1nt1ng  and  Publishing 
29  l11de  and  Pel: 
30  Rubber  and  Plast1cs 
31  Chem1cals 
32  Ojl  and  Coal 
33  Non-metallic  Ore 
34  Base  Melal~ 
15  P1n1shcd  Metal  Products 
36  Mcchantcc~l  Engincer1ng 
37  Elcctr1cal  Eng1neer1ng 
38  Transport 
39  Other  lndustr1es 
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Industr1al 
sector 
20 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
30 
31 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
II.  e~ployment anc  f1rm  s1ze  1n  Greece  and  1n  t••e  European  Commun1ty 
Table  II.1.  Standard  f1r~  size,  by  country  (2)  and  sector 
France 
1-4 
100-499 
1-4 
1-4 
1-4 
100-499 
1000  + 
100-499 
100-499 
1000  + 
100-499 
100-499 
100-499 
1000  + ' 
(33% 
(42% 
I 
<29%~ 
C25%J 
(41%~ 
(45%~ 
<29%~ 
I 
<34% 
Italy 
1-4 
100-499 
1-4 
1-4 
1-4 
100-499 
1000  + 
100-499 
(  32%~ 100-499 
(67%  1000  + 
(25%  100-499 
<36%)1 
(3Q%1  1000  + 
(27% 
I 
<33% 
(49% 
<59% 
<38%1 
(36%~ 
I 
(24%1 
(28% 
(29% 
C41% 
<31% 
( 59%)1 
'  I  I 
1  8elg1um  I  Fed.  Rep.  '!  Greece  United  Japan 
of  Germany  States 
I  I  ---r 
tJetber Lands 
I  I 
50-99  C22%~  100-499  <31%1  1-4  <22%:  i-4  <38%  100~499  C41%  100-49v  C22%1 
1000  +  C31%j  100-499  C44%)J'  100-499  C41%j  100-499  <34%  100-499  C42%  100-499  C22%j 
!  [  I 
50-99  C33%J  100-499  <29%~  100-499  <30%;  1-4  C45%  100-499  C44%  20-49  <22%~ 
50-99  (30%)  20  ~  49 
I  I 
<30%)  1-4  (25%)  1-4  (53%  100-499  <30%~ 
:  i 
50-99  C33%j  20-49  C24%)  100-499  (3L%)  1-<.  (56%  100-499  C41%J 
50-99  C29%j  100-499  C39%~  100-499  (45%)  "OO-L99  C25%i  100-499  C46%~ 
1  01)0  +  ( 24 'Y,) 
1000  + 
50-99 
1000  + 
50-99 
1000  + 
1000  + 
' 
(37%~ 
! 
(37%1 
CSO%i 
C24d 
' 
(25%~ 
(67%J. 
i 
I 
1000  +  C37%i  1000  + 
100-499  C35%l 
100-499  (32%1  100-499 
1000  +  <70%~  1000  + 
100-499  (31%~  100-499 
100-499  (28%~  1000  + 
1000  +  (65%~  1000  + 
1000  + 
(33%) 
C66%Y, 
C32d 
1 
(39%~ 
' 
(48%~ 
1JC-499  <33%~  1000  +  (34% 
I 
<QQ-499  (32%~  1000  :;  .37% 
100-499  <23%~  100-499  (36%' 
1000  +  (54%~  1000  +  (54% 
1-4  (41%~  100-499  (37% 
1-4  <25%~  1000  +  (33% 
1QQ-499  (19%1  1000  +  (53% 
1-4  (31%~ 1000  + 
20-49 
20-49 
100-499 
1000  + 
1000  + 
i 
(28%), 
<22%~ 
c25d 
(~%~ 
I 
<33% 
100-499  <26% 
1000  +  (42% 
20-49  C23%j 
100-499  (28%~ 
1000  + 
1000  + 
(40%1 
(1)  Standard  firm  s1ze·1s  def1ned  as  the  category  of  f1rm  that  accounts  for  the  largest  share  of  employment  in  each  1nd1vidual 
sector:  This -does  not  necessar1Ly  mean  that  the  ma]or1ty  of  firms  1n  that  sector  fall  into  th1s  category.  The  f1gures  1n 
brackets  refer ,to  t!l,e.;'per;centage  of  total  number  employed  accounted  for  oy  this  category of  firm . 
. ,  '-- - .  ''.: 
(2) .The  stat1stics  for  the ·commun1ty  countries,  Japan  and  the  United States  refer  to  1963,  those  for  Greece  to  1973. 
~  Ca)  Comm1.ssi.on  oJ  t_he  European.Communities  "Industnal  Policy  1n  the  Commumty",  Brussels  1970,  Table  9,  p.  99  and 
Tab l~  · 2_-:of:the ·~sJ·at 1st  i cal  annex . 
.::  -.  ~  '  . 
<bl  Statist.ical  Yearbook  of  Greece,  Athens  1976,  Table  X-4,  p.  220-221. 
<.,,  • Table 
o-
11.2  Dis~rLbutLon of  firms  by  Slze according to the  number  employed  and by branch  of  economic  activity. 
(Total  for  all categories.ln each  sector  = 100.00) 
Percentage  of  firms  employLng 
. 
Indu- 1000 
strial  and 
sector  1- 4  5-9  10  - 19  20  - 49  50  -. 99  100  - 499  500  - 999  over 
20  3 7. 8  14.2  8.9  11.6  7.9  17.3  2.3  -
21  19.8  10.6  11.1  12.7  9.5  25.5  10.8  -
22  1.1  1.6  3.8  12.2  14.5  29.4  20.4  16.8 
23  10.1  8.1  8.7  13.0  10 .l  34.4  10.9  4.5 
24  45.0  11.9  10.8  12.9  6.0  10.1  0.7  2.5 
25  52.8  16.5  8.4  7.0  2.8  5.8  - 6.6 
2,6  55.5  16.6  10.6  9.2  4.0  2.3  1.9  -
27  4.9  8.2  10.9  11.9  11.0  .'4. 8  ,_0. '2  .  18.0 
28  24.1  14.6  14.4  13.1  6.7  25.1  - -
29  33.5  29.1  16.2  9.2  8.5  3.5  - -
30  15.1  8.8  12.2  19.9  10.8  33.1  - -
I 
31  5.7  5.9  6.8  15.1  11.1  32.4  11.0  12.8 
I 
i 
32  3.6  3.5  7.1  16.3  10.9  41..8  16.5  -
33  22.3  15.0  11.8  16.1  6.3  23.1  5.5  -
34  0.3  0.4  0.8  2.2  1.7  13.6  27.5'  53.5 
35  40.9  11.2  8.6  -9.8  7.1  14.7  5.2  2.6 
36  24.5  15.9  15.4  19.1  7.2  14.4  3.4  -
37  17.2  9.0  7.1  9.9  9.3  18.7  16.7  13.0 
38  30.9  8.0  4.7  6.3  5.5  11.4  9.4.  23.8 
39  47.4  15.2  11.6  12.3  6.1  7.1  - -
20  - 39  30.4  11.8  9.4  11.7  7.4  17.7  5.8  5.8 
Source:  J.  Hassid,  'Greece  and  the  European  Community',· IOBE,  Athens  1977,  Statistical Annex  p.  68-69. ·able  11.3  Average  number  of  persons  employed  by  category  and  by  sector 
in  Greek  industry  (1973) 
Firms  employ1ng 
!  Sector  0-9  persons  10-49  persons  50  persons  and 
20  2,5  19,3  131,5 
21  1,5  19,1  165,4 
22  I  8,6  24,2  188,5 
23  2,9  20,1  182,5 
24  1,8  19,0  I  138,2 
25  2,1  17,6  187,8 
26  2,2  17,5  100,5 
27  4,1  18,9  243,1 
28  2,9  18,4  136,8 
i  29  3,2  16,3  82,9 
I 
30  2,6  20,8  136,4 
' 
31  3,4  22,1  197,6 
32  4,1  21,2  186,.1 
33  3,0  19,6  176,4 
34  5,1  23,9  583,1 
35  2,0  18,7  155,8 
36  2,9  19,3  129,3 
37  2,2  20,0  220,0 
38  2,2  19,5  314,9 
39  2,0  18,7  123,5 
20-39  2,3  19,3  177,2 
over 
Source:  'Small-scale  industry'  CPER,  Athens,  June  1976,  p.17 
able  11.4  Number  of  firms  and  persons  employed  in all  industry  and  percentage 
distribution  by  category  (1973) 
I  Category  Number  Percentage  Total  rercentaqe 
(No of  persons  of 
sht=~re  number 
shar!•  employed)  firms  employed 
0  - 2  82.069  67,6  114.000  18,9 
3  - 9  31.410  25,9  142.000  23,3 
10  -49  6.629  5,5  127.000  21,1 
so  -99  645  0,5  44.000  7,4 
100  -499  534  '0,4  107.000  17,7 
500  +  78  0,1  70.000  11,6 
Total  121.357  100  604.000  100 
' 
Source: Idem  Table  11.3. 
- 62  -- 63  -
Table  11.5  Regional  distribution of  firms  and  percentage  share  of  employment  by  category  (1973) 
Firms  employing 
0  - 9  10  - 49 
Region  %  of  firms  %  of  employed  %  of  firms  % of  employed  %  of  firms 
Greater  Athens  90,4  36,0  8,2  23,8  1,4 
Hest  of  central 
Athens  94,4  - 4,0  - 1,6 
Macedonia  93,1  41,0  5,6  23,5  1,3 
PelqxYJnes.os  93,9  38,0  5,2  19,2  0,9 
Thessaly  95,4  50,0  3,9  19,5  0,7 
Crete  97,8  72,5  2,0  15,2  0,2 
rhrace  97,2  73,9  2,6  14,4  0,2 
Epirus  97,2  68,2  2,3  13,8  0,5 
Islands  97,9  71,6  1,8  11,6  0,3 
Total  93,5  42,2  5,5  21,1  1,0 
~--------- -- ----------- ------- - -
Source:  "Statistical  Yearbook  of  Greece",  Athens  1976,  Table  X-2,  p.218  and  'Small-scale  industry' 
see  above,  Tables  3.4  and  3~5 of  the  statistical annex. 
50  and  over 
% of  employed 
40,2 
-
35,5 
42,8 
30,5 
12,3 
8,7 
18,0 
16,7 
36,6 
---- --
-, 
I Table  III.  Principal  features of  Greek  industry 
1.  Numbers  employed  and  value  added  (1973) 
Employment  in  Employment  in  Value  added  in 
- 1  aLl  industry  Large  scale  industry  large  scale  i ndust r)l 
I 
Industry 
-
1\b.of  persons  in  %3  No.  of persons .,  1n  %4  in thousand  in  %5~ 
employed  employed  drachmae 
Ove.ra ll  604.042  100  I  301.407  100  67.937.082  100 
r======================  ===================================~================================ 
Food 
Beverages 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Clothing  and  footwear 
Wood  and  Cork 
Furniture 
Paper 
Printing and  Publishing 
Leather 
Rubber  and-Plastics 
Chemicals 
Petroleum  and  coal  products 
Non-metallic  m1nerals 
Basic  metals 
Metal  products 
Machinery 
(non-elect rica l) 
Electrical  machinery 
Transport 
Miscellaneous 
89.285  14,8 
12.307  2,0 
9.049  1,5 
68.419  11,3 
72.030  11,9 
34.406  5,7 
29.445  4,9 
7.971  1,3 
15.963  2,6 
13.061  2,2 
15.832  2,6 
20.255  3,4 
3.765  0,4 
37.465  6,2 
7.859  1,3 
47.850  7,9 
23.697  3,9 
30.473  5,0 
52.808  8,7 
1 2. 1  02  2  46  , 
40.049  13,2 
8.208  2,9 
8.495  2,8 
53.375  17,7 
21.464  7,1 
8.727  2,8 
5.976  1,9 
6.817  2,2 
8.765  2,9 
3.034  1,0 
10.292  3,4 
17.571  5,8 
3.085  1,0 
20.564  6,8 
7.676  I  2,5 
I  19.383  6,4 
9.902  3,2 
19.552  6,4 
24.136  8,0 
3.335  1,1 
1 Large-scale  industry  in  Greek  statistical  yearbooKs  means  those  br_anches  of  industry  in  which  all 
employ  10  persons  and  over.  _ 
2 There  are  no  statistics for  value  added  in  industry  as  a whole. 
3 As  a %  of, total  employment,  for  1973. 
4 As  a%  of  total  employment  in  large-scale  industry,  for  1973. 
5 As  a%  of  total  value  added  in  large-scale industry,  for  1973. 
6 The  last figure  is obtained  by  subtracting  all  the  others  from  100. 
7.431.656 
2.521.642 
1.499.421 
10.921.361 
2.530.729 
1.743.314 
813.809 
1.687.771 
1.633.881 
82.757 
2.686.053 
5.719.746 
2.903.414 
4.739.879 
6.312.142 
4.255.925 
1.509.618 
4.329.780 
3.820.667 
470.517 
firms 
Source:  Sta-tistical  Yearbook  of  Greece,  197_5,  col.  1 fr;m  Table  X-1,  p.  ?17  cols •.  3 and~ rrom  Tahlo  X-
1!,  ~·  i'\1) 
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10, 
3, 
2, 
16, 
3, 
2, 
1, 
2, 
2, 
o, 
3,c 
B,l 
4,, 
6,' 
9,, 
6,< 
2,< 
6,_ 
S,t 
1,7 o-
Vl 
HI.2. 
I se:ctor 
I 
I 
I  20 
I 
~a~u~ pcocuct::..v::..ty  a  = 
"  B  ;'  TB 
~,  gross  .?._nvest.rnen ':.  ;_  r  gross  ;..nvestrren~  pe~ y;e~son ern!?loyeC  !c  =  ~  1 
--- r .. 
re-::ucns  to scale s,  elas'::::..cc.'::.y  of :=:u'Jstitu'::lon  anc  capJ.'::al  ::..n':ensiveness of Hor'cers  :"Jy  sec'::o:::- (1973) 
·----
a  = 
~ 
·-
"':hc  .  .:;oan c'1 
c-..::a.c':'_  ....  .c., e 
l rr  -r  u=' ::::-, 
307,21 
167  ,-~-: 
204.61 
11'7,'?) 
199,73 
13f ,1'7 
2·- -- --'I :J) 
l8E,.;; 
1 -o  11  .,._:;>,...,......._...._ 
260,SS 
325,52 
g4~.13 
230,~'? 
822,?2 
2l9,SE 
lt;'l  :;::  _  _,..._I-._. 
--
' 
I 
in  % 
I 
I 
82,2 
136,4 
74,2 
0.0,7 
52,0 
88,4 
60,.:! 
109,8 
82,7 
70,7 
115,8 
14.:!,4 
41E',2 
102,2 
355,3 
I  97,3 
57,5 
I 
' 
' 
; 
' 
' 
I 
I 
I 
! 
i 
I 
I 
'  ' 
I 
I 
I 
'  I 
IB  :tn  ::..n  ?o 
thousanc2  c'.rachmae 
225043e  12,1 
659626  I  3,5 
1~09.:!1  1,0 
3001970  15,  J. 
376093  2,0 
I 
651493  3,5  ' 
I 
150974  o,e 
339589  1,8 
I  225022  1,2 
4617.:!  0,2 
4'?9921  2,7 
132C97.:!  7,1 
17532.:!5  9,£! 
2264286  i  12,2 
I  1333243  7,2 
1o422e1  I  5,5  I 
3L!f!L154  !  1,9 
i 
"'  TB 
I  ' 
'  I  I 
]<  =  ~'"  ln  :  1n  %  s  ;<  J.n  :J  5) 
I  I 
thousanc' 
3  i  '  thousanc.L1  I 
I  I  I  c'rach11ae · 
C'rachmae  I  I 
I  ' 
56,1S2  !  Sl,l  I  1,00  sg,se  0,61  I 
'  !  0.1.39  b.l.75 
80,363  130,1  1,30  261,33  1,00 
21,299  34,5  - 95,33  -
~~~~£.!2  91,1  1,17  159,66  2,63 
17,522  28,4  1,oe  3,08  2,50 
74,644  120,9  1,22  37,09  2,78 
25,233  I  40,8  1,09  11,80  2,00 
49,815  '  80,7  1,09  436,00  - i 
25,672  I 
41,7  1,12  54,75  3,59 
15,218  24,6  1,07  19,92  4,17 
48,573  I  7'2,5  1,18  I 
H9,68  1,00 
75,534 
I 
122,5  1,24  579,40  1,00 
558,. 313  921,1  - I  1410,26  -
110,109  I 
17~,3  1,15 
I 
265,18  1,.42 
173,539 
I 
2'21,5)  1,18  l648,E'L!)  1,00  53,772  '27,0)  :'3.74)  I 
35,1Sl 
I  56,9)  36,37) 
!( /  1n  % 
64,50 
188,16 
68,64 
114,96 
5,82 
26,70 
8,50 
313 t 92 
I 
39; ·12 
lL! f  3.:! 
107177 
417 t 17 
1015,3S 
150.93 
1127,.16 
60,29 
26,lS' 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
3L! 
35 
35 
37 
3e 
39 
20-39 
22~  . .;_: 
l5C,2S 
141, 1.:~ 
22S,3S 
I 
se  .. 2 
70,2 
62,7 
I 
l  100,0 
------ -------
I  918495  '  .:!.9 
I  1083530  5,8  I 
I  138285  0,7 
I 
!  18592855  ~S9,7 
--------·----
I  I  I 
1,22  2,50 
46,977  76,2)  'Cl, 77) 
;;;~6 J  44,9~2  I  72,9  I  1,21  I  ~5,28  2,50  I 
I 
41,464  I 
67,3 
I 
1,00  16,12  1,49  11.61 
61,686  I 
100,0  1,16  I 
138,86  2,33  100,00 
I 
tlotes on 111. 2 . 
l  T_,aJxmr  r:n:oc' _;:;-::j_vJ.'::y  has been calcula'::.ec"  fo:::- la_-ge-scale  :tne'ust.ry only,  as '::her.:e  a:ce  no  s·~a':;J_stJ_cs  for vc:lue  ac"C'eC'  1.n  :.ne'ustry 
as  a  VJ~1oh~.  ?lg'.:res  a>:-e  !::>asec"  on  C'.c.t.a  fcom  Ta~::>le III .1. 
2  The  s~a'::lst:..c:  for  g:::-oss  ::..nvestment  are ta;cen f":."om  Table  2~-7,  p.  226-7 of '::he  Sta'::J_stical  ~'ea":."'Joo
1(  of C:r.eece.  l'lo  c:ata are 
availalJle  fo:c  c'eprecJ_a:.3_on.  Gr.:oss  J_nves:rrten':.  .incluC'es machJ_necy,  lJuilC'J.ng,  '::.ranspor'::.,  furnJ.'::.u.re,  o~fice flt'::.J.ngs,  lane anc" 
o'::her  p:::ovis:..O('.S. 
3  ?or  lc.rse-scc::..e  .inc'ustry,.  as a  % of the average  for all :mcustry. 
4  ~alcula  .... ec  ::·-~-r·  c'3.ta  :i_n  TclJle  :::u .l, column  l  ane'  TalJle  ::v-1 column 1  ( f:tgures  ln  brac~(e'::s  e~~resseC'. as u  = i ln tl1ousanc:' 
crachma.e  ~~  r~rson e~lovec).  (~l  !  6  (~) 
5  The elas  ... ic:i.:.y  ,_,;:  sul::s'utu'::.ion  a  ~-s  c"efJ_nec  as 0
6
1
~:. ~  o:::- assurnJ.ng  ':he  t..}}eory  of marginal prc:x:'uctivi_ty:  0 ::.  "(~Y/6A). 
\zJ  K 
0  6Y/6K 
SoLccce ·  ~al:Jl"'  ~~': -l.  F:ta'::J_st:..cal  "ear'1od~ of G>:-eece  ;:-7,  :; .  226-7..  !JJ e  "'leininc"us:::::-:.e'',  Ta':lle  9.1 of ':he  stat:tstJ.cal annex 
f:Y/6A 
6Y7Qi<  -;;:-· 
R Table III.3 
Exports  and irrports by sector of Greek 1naustry 
(1974,  at current prices) 
' 
Sector Exports  Exports  Imports  Imports  Exports  as a  % 
in rnil.lJm  in %  in rmJlim  1n  %  of liilpOrts 
drachmae  drachmae 
:0  4  570  11,2  5.7J6  5,7  eo,; 
22  ~2'7  0,&  235  O,J  136,6 
22  ?6  0,1  i5  0,02  162,5 
:J  5.5~H  1J,r3  J.G~J  - ~  ...J.~  1b2'' 1 
-;r.  3.717  :!, i  ,JJU  0,5  tl5<l,ll 
:-;  3fi9  0,:'  i .-·c2  2,0  20,Y 
:a  44  0', 1  ~=  0,1  ~o.o 
27  ?b?  G,li  l.r~:::. J  4,5  6,8 
:5  1uu  0,2  ?90  0,3  311,5 
-c 
<.- 57C  3,9  .·\·=~  1 ,c  i28,2 
:L,  ~e::.  '],5  '  1")""/  ;  .,  1fi,:::  _, 
:1  J.C5?  -, 
',::i  ,  .. .J::::·  151:3 
..,..,  C) 
<.  ·-
- :5.  ~;[;..'  13,3  2  .'!ECJ  2,9  21f3,0 
~-
-.-,  2.d8G  6,1  1. '!?fl  1,3  221,2 
...  9  .f..;; /2  23,)  1::.·.  "j[•t:  1C,)  78,6 
~5  1.3oa  3,2  2 . .:70  2,5  :::=:  .,  ........ ,'-
_  _,  376  0,9  ':~.?. ::-:?  22,7  1,9 
37  879  2,2  7  555  8,5  , 1,6 
-~'3  370  0,9  7  2tl~/  8,5  5,1 
::;  495  1,2  2.265  2,6  21.9 
20 
20-39  40.732  100,0  86.010  100,0  a?,c 
Source:  Tables VI  a  - VII b,  p.  25-28,  'Basic metal  industries' 
CPER,  Athens  July 1976 
- 6(:. Table IV. 
The  capital structure of Greek  industry 
IV.l 
Gross capital stock of joint stock and limted liability 
companies by industrial sector and average annual rate of 
growth for  ~he period  ~958 to 1973  (at constant 1958  prices) 
Fixed capital stock be-
Industrlal :  .  .fore_depreciat  ion  (  1973) 
in mill1on  ias a% of 
sect_o_r  ______  -rdr  __  achma~~?!) ---t~~._a_l  __  __ 
20  Food 
I 
711~ (7973)
1 
9,6 
21  Beverages 
22  Tobacco 
23  Textiles 
2800  (J1:5j  3,7 
:'65  ·~  556)  ~  c 
9...,5 1  ( 10S;: 1)  13, 1 
24  Clothing and footwear 
25  Wocd  and cork 
26  Furniture 
27  Paper 
28  Printing .and Publishing 
29  Leather and skins 
30  Rubber  and plastics 
31  Cherrucals 
"'  32  Petroleum and coal product 
520  (  852) 
1140  l 1276] 
3114  (348:3) 
762  (  876) 
231  (  ?59) 
1UJC•G  ( 11588)  I 
4785  (5359) 
33  Non~metallic minerals  18655  l99i8) 
34  Bas1c metals  1114G3l1?551J 
35  Metal  industry  3551  lr,o; 1 l 
36  Machinery  (non-electrical)  no ( asz) 
37  Electrical machinery 
38  Transport 
39  Other 
20-39 
2227  (24c;c.) 
I  rt.S:'J?  l.B3l'72; 
0,7  ·. 
1,5 
o,4 
4,2 
1,0 
0,3 
13,8 
6,4 
11,8 
15,3 
11,8 
1,0 
J,D 
5,4 
Percentage of 
total cap1tal 
by sector 
9,5 
3,7 
1,0 
13,0 
0,.7 
1,5 
0,4 
4,2 
1 ,o 
0,4 
13,8 
6,4 
11,8 
15,3 
4,8 
1,0 
3,0 
~.a 
10U,IJ 
Source:  Georg  F.  Koutsoumaris  'The  financing.and development of 1ndustry' 
IOBE,  Athens  1976,  p.· 26-27. 
1The  capital stock of joint-stock and limited llability companies  accounted in  I (r/l 
'  for  90%  of all industry  (cf.  Koutsoumaris  op.  c~t, p.  13). 
- '. 
Estimates of the fixed capital stock of all industry  (in brackets)  are based on  the 
above  figure and on  the further assumption that it applies across the board. 
- 67 I 
I 
I 
I 
Tabel  IV.  2 
Percentage  of  total  gross  investment  (column  II),  annual  average  rate  of  growth 
in groii fixed capital  siock  (column  III)  and  in  production  <column  IV)  and  production 
elasticity of  capital  (column  V)  for  each  sector  (1958-1973) 
Industrial  sector  II  III  IV  v (1) 
in  X 
Chemicals  (31), 
Petroleum  and  coal  products(32)  19,7  15,1  16,4  1,09 
Basic  metal  ind.  (34)  16,4  25,7  25,9  1,01 
Non-metallic  minerals  (33)  12,0 
I  15,7  13,1  0,83 
Metal  industry  (35), 
Electrical  (37)  and 
non-electrical  mach.  (36)  8,6  14,5  11,2  0,77 
Textiles  <23)  12,5  12,8  9,1  0,72 
Transport  (38)  5,5  20,0  12,3  0,61 
Paper  (27),  printing 
and  publishing  <28)  5,3  19,0  10,6  0,56 
Food  (20),  beveraqes  (21)  i  I 
and  tobacco  C22)  13,5  12,3  6,1  0,50 
Wood  and  cork  C25), 
furniture  (26)  2,1  30,9  10,9  0,35 
Leather  (29),  rubber  and 
plastics  C3Q)  other  C39)  3,6  21,8  7,6  0,35 
Footwear  and  clothing  (24)  0,8  38,6- 4,9  0,13 
Tnt~l  ( 20  - 3.9).  100,0  15,8  1063  0,65 
--
C1)  The  production elasticity of  capital  is  calculated as  a quotient  of  the  rate 
or  growth,  for 
E  Wy  _ rtlvt  _ dYt  Kt 
y(K}·--~--
IYy  Kt/  Kt  dKt  Yt 
Source:  see  IV.1. 
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Return  on  capital  by  sector  for  the  period  1959- 1973. 
Bef,?re  depreciation,  in,,%  1),  Z) 
11  Net  profit,  in  'J,  :3) 
Sedor  I  ~  .,  u  .,  A  "  ?  ,.  .  u  M  0  •  "  2 
•  •• 
0  :•-'c''l  II  ~.•  V'Jrage  II-·  oilJo.U~U11  u1,  \'llnlmum  II  •  Average 
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1 The  left-hand  columns  of  the  m1n1mum,  average  and  maximum  return  on  capital  before  and  after  depreciation  show  the 
return  on  capital  by  sector  as  a%  of  the  average  for  all  industry. 
2 & 3 
tixed  capital  at  end  of  year  at  current  prices,  less  depreciat1on  up  to  end  of  previous  year  plus  the  average  turnover 
capital  (incl.  reserves)  as  at  the  beginning  and  end  of  year,  expressed  as  a%  of  capital  employed. 
Source:  see  IV.l.,  p.  138-139 
- .....69....  -IV.  6 
Table  IV.  6  RatJO  between debts plus provlslons and capltal plus reserves in jolnt-
stock and 1Jmlted llab11ity C~Jan1es by sector  (1973) 
Sector 
1 n  rntllJ on  drachmae  at current prices 
Debts plus 
prOVLSlOnS 
Cap1tal plus 
reserves 
Debts + provLsLons 
Capltal  + reserves 
D l 
I 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20  1.2.340  5.110  2,415  116,1 
21  4.823  l.  724  2,798  135,4 
n  2.182  934  2,336  113,1 
21  17.271  8.804  1,.962  95,0 
24  1.887  777  2,429  117,6 
25  1..862  1.304  1,428  '!:.69,1 
26  602  417  1,444  69,8 
27  3.909  1.528  2,558  123,8 
28  964  889  1,084  52,5 
29  581  328  l,  771  85,7 
30  3.520  ].981  1,  777  :86,0 
31  10.547  7.G17  ] ,385  67,0 
32  II .464  1.588  7,219  394,4 
'''• 
33  7. 991  5.379  1,486·._;'1  71,9 
~-
.34  11.6!1  5.897  l,969'G  95,3 
15  6.l34  .3.341  1,836  88,8 
36  I.  732  885  1,957  94, 7 
37  7.688  .3.262  2,357  114,1 
38  ~! .120  4.407  2,069  ] CX), 0 
39  350  253  1,383  66,9 
20 - l'J  II h.57B  56.425  2,066  100 
I 
II 
I 
l. ------ ______ _L ___ . ---- ------_____ __I 
o· 
~iourcc  :  Sec  lV. l., Table  16  of the stat1st1cal annex. 
f{al Lo  of dcbLs  +  f:.lrovJ.slons  I  car)ltal +  reserves  as  a  percentage of the 
tndustnal  average. 
- ?fl  -
'I 
I 
. I I  ....  I  .... 
Table  V.  Return  on  cap1tal  and  ca91tal costs  by  sector  of  Greek  1ndustry  (1973) 
1.  I  2.  3. 
I  4.  I  5.  I  6.=  (4-3)  I  I 
Borrc~ed cap1tal  m  I  Financ1al  out+  Cost  of  I  Return  o?l)  I 
mlll:..on  drachmae  I  lay  at  curlE11:'  oorrowed( 2 )  !  !  ( 3)  !  cap1tal 
pr1ces  !  cap1tal  I  1n  % 
'  ln  %(=2:1)  I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
20  11.069  i  50316  ~,5  718  I  9118 
I 
I  l 
I  ' 
21 
!  ..;.185 
I  26110  612  810 
I  12615  ' 
I  I  !  I  ! 
22  !  2.040  I  6113  310  i  611  I  6112  i 
I  I 
23 
I  I  I  I  I  :  l5.959  i 
99418  612  1018  i 
12615  I  :  ' 
24  !  1. 592  I  7318  I  416  919  I  9319 
I 
I 
I  I  I  I 
25  I 
1. 694  '  7817  416  1419  I  3319 
I  I  : 
26  I  543  I  2113  i  319  915  I  8010  I 
27  I  3.868  19019  I  419  I  717  I  10010  I 
I  :  I  I  I 
28  I  866  3414  :  410  I  1013  I  8116  I  ' 
I 
I  I  I  I  29  528  33,9  '  614  814  130,6 
I  !  I  I  I 
30  I  3.259  15019  I  416  I  1115  I  9319  I  I 
31  I  9.-90  50916  512  I  812  I  10611  I 
I  I  I  I  I 
32  I  9.:i.57  41618  415  I  1214  I  9118  I 
33  I  7.460  27219  317  I  619  I  7515  I 
I  i  I  I  I 
34  I  11.-:-59  53118  415  I  1011  I  9118  I 
35  I  5.695  27819  419  I  1314  I  10010  I 
I  I  I  I 
36  I  1.656  8118  419  I  712  I  10010  I 
37  I  6.860  35415  512  I  919  I  10611  I 
I  I  I  I 
38  I  6.156  34415  412  I  512  I  8517  I 
39  !  330  1412  413  I  1016  I  8718  I 
i  I  I  ' 
20-39  i  106.486  5.20914  419  I  - I  10010 
(1)  As  a  % of  total  pr1ce1  1.e.  cap1tal ·plus  reserves  +  1iab1l1t1es. 
(2)  As  a  % outlay  ~ debts  plus  prov1s1ons.  (Source  :  See  IV.l.  Tables  18  and  19  of  the  stat1stical annex. 
(3)  Cost  of  liab1l1t1es  as  a  % of  the  industr1al  average. 
1n  % 
313 
118 
311 
416 
513 
1013 
516 
218 
613 
210 
619 
310 
719 
312 
516 
815 
213 
417 
110 
613 : 
I 
Table  VI 
Industrial 
sector' 
20-39 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
The  cost  situation of  Greek  industry 
Percentage  breakdown  of  various  types  of  cost in  large-scale 
industry  C1973) 
---
1 
Wages  and  Raw  Fuels  and  Miscelllaneous  materials  electric  salaries  and  machinery  energy1  Capital  2  costs 
12,1  52,2  2,8  6,8  26,1 
8,2  64,1  1,4  8,8  17, 
8,8  58,5  1,1  7,3  24,3 
8,2  69,0  0,3  5,5  17,0 
12,6  51,1  1,7  7,3  27,3 
16,4  54,6  0,4  5,7  22,9 
12,6  53,3  1,8  3,1  2_  ,2 
19,3  49,5  0,8  3,7  26,7 
11,4  50,9  4,5  5,3  27,9 
24,6  39,8  0,8  8,2  26,6 
10,9  66,0  0,8  4,0  18,3 
14,2  43,6 
I 
2,0  5,2  35,0 
12,6  40,4  3,2  1 o, 1  33,7 
3,1  69,5  2,5  1,7  23,2 
16,9  21,5  13,4  12,9  3  ,3 
7,2  42,5  8,9  7,1  34,3 
12,7  53,5  1,5  4,6  27,7 
19,6  so,s  0,9  6,0  23,0 
12,2  58,3  0,7  3,8  25,0 
31,5  39,2  1,0  4,4  23,9 
19,3  4-5,1  0,9  0,7  34,0 
1The  percentages  given  for  energy  costs  relate  to  the  period prior  to  the oil 
crisis  and  oil  price  increases,  and  are  therefore  well  below  current  Levels. 
The  actual  percentages  must  be  considered  to  be  several  factors  higher  than 
those  shown. 
2•capital  costs'  is a  broad  term  covering  not  only  net  profit  and  the  cost  of 
borrowed  capital,  but  also  the  costs  of  services  rendered  to  the  industrial 
sector  by  third persons.  The  Greek  statistical yearbooks  do  not  show  the  cost 
of  such  services  separately.  A similar presentation is  found  in  'The  development 
of  Greek  industry'  Michael  Gevetsis,  Athens  1975,  p.  152. 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on  the  data  from  the Statistical  Yearbook  of 
Greece,  1976,  tables  X-5  and  X-6,  p.  222-225. 
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